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Quieting the Court: Lessons from The Muslim
Ban Case
Avidan Y. Cover *
The Supreme Court’s Muslim ban decision in Trump v. Hawaii calls into
question the civil rights litigation enterprise insofar as lawsuits challenge the
U.S. government’s injurious national security and immigration policies. Litigants and advocacy organizations should employ an array of strategies and
tactics to avoid the Court’s rulings that almost uniformly defer to, and thus
validate, the government’s national security and immigration practices.
This article maintains that The Muslim Ban Case was a predictable outgrowth of the Supreme Court’s national security-immigration jurisprudence
that champions executive power at the expense of marginalized groups, in
particular non-citizens. The Article provides a typology of these cases’ features and examines how The Muslim Ban Case exhibits these same characteristics but also exceeds recent precedents in its disregard of the ban’s bigoted motivations and its excessive deference to the President.
In light of The Muslim Ban Case and the judiciary’s conservative trajectory, this Article proposes that civil-rights lawyers and legal advocacy organizations assess whether their litigation risks validating the President’s arrogation of power and the concomitant suppression of minority groups’
liberties. Recognizing the at-times life-saving and moral necessity of litigation, this article first offers discrete litigation strategies that may avoid future adverse decisions. The Article then examines extra-judicial forms of
advocacy that groups and individuals may adopt in order to secure and develop marginalized groups members’ liberties. This project entails challenging the current legal rights framework’s underlying ideas of American identity, which privileges national sovereignty and citizenship. The Article
proposes a more inclusive framework that imposes duties on the state to
non-citizens through connections of the family and universal values.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court’s Muslim ban decision in Trump v.
Hawaii 1 raises an important question for civil-rights attorneys seeking protection for their clients from the U.S. government’s harmful national security policies: Should they stop litigating? Or more specifically, what strategies should civil-rights advocates employ to avoid the Supreme Court’s
rulings that almost uniformly defer to, and thus validate, the government’s
national security practices?
Civil-rights attorneys have long sought refuge for their clients in court
when government action threatens people’s constitutional rights. Advocates look to an independent judiciary to act as a check on the political
branches, curbing majoritarian excesses. But in the national security
realm—particularly at the Supreme Court stage—good intentions and high
expectations often lead to negative, long-term consequences for the very
people and principles their advocates seek to protect. The proposed opposition to litigating is thus both specialized and opportunistic—very much “a
sometime thing”2—aimed at protecting minority and immigrant rights in
the national security context.
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Supreme Court has issued opinions
that generally endorse the government’s national security policies and practices, including, but not limited to, long-term detention, abusive security
measures, and criminalizing the teaching of international humanitarian
law. 3 Rather than serve as a check on the President and his invocation of

1 This Article refers to Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) as The Muslim Ban Case. In
doing so, I underscore the Article’s thesis, which is that, in litigating national security civilrights cases in the courts—and the Supreme Court in particular—advocates succumb to an
inhospitable legal rights framework that reiterates narratives, which heighten executive power and diminish marginalized and immigrant groups’ interests. These narratives adopt arguments, cases, and terminology that invariably validate government policies; language matters.
By denominating the case as The Muslim Ban Case (similar to The Chinese Exclusion Case née
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889)), this Article aims to resist validating
the Trump v. Hawaii opinion in linguistic fashion. It is my hope that the Article raises additional questions over whether and how advocates resist legally validating the ban and future
harmful government policies.

Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1351 (2006)
[hereinafter Waldron, Judicial Review] (quoting CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF
FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND UNNAMED 109 (1997)).
2

3 See infra Part I.A–E. See generally Avidan Y. Cover, Presumed Imminence: Judicial Risk Assessment
in the Post-9/11 World, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1415 (2014) [hereinafter Cover, Presumed Imminence] (cataloguing judicial fact-finding and deference in post-9/11 cases). Judicial deference
is not merely a post-9/11 casualty; upholding executive action in the national security context has a long history. Id. at 1443–45. Justice Breyer contends that the Court has “moved
from an attitude of deference to one of scrutiny” in national security cases. STEPHEN
BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW GLOBAL REALITIES
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foreign affairs powers and execution of counterterrorism policies, the
Court’s opinions—even the “wins”—often legitimize the President’s actions. Civil-rights advocates thus do not simply “lose” national security cases in the Supreme Court. By vindicating national security policies, the
Court provides precedents for the political branches and the judiciary to
follow and build on in the future. These opinions embolden aggressive
counterterrorism actions, with potential spillover into domestic contexts far
removed from national security and foreign affairs. The government and
courts may thus seek to leverage The Muslim Ban Case—an opinion about
the President’s extensive authority to limit the entry of aliens 4 to the country—to broaden presidential powers as they relate to policies within the
United States and weaken individuals’ antidiscrimination protections.
The Trump presidency heightens concerns that judicial validation of
belligerent national security polices is likely to increase in the coming years
for at least three reasons. First, President Trump acts with less restraint
than prior presidents, adopting policies that both aggressively curtail constitutional rights and rely on expansive Article II theories of a powerful Executive. 5 The Muslim ban proclamation is a prime example. 6 Second, Pres80 (2015). Such scrutiny, however, may often serve to legitimize, rather than check, presidential power. See infra Part I.F. Moreover, the constancy of the national surveillance state
and the prospect of a forever war elevate worries about the long-term effect on civil liberties. See Cover, Presumed Imminence, supra at 1418–19; Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the
National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 11–20 (2008); BREYER, supra at 81 (suggesting
that the Court has more readily accepted post-9/11 cases to review because of the indefinite
nature of terrorist threats).
4 As Justice Sotomayor noted in her dissent in The Muslim Ban Case, “many consider ‘using
the term “alien” to refer to other human beings’ to be ‘offensive and demeaning.’” The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2443, n.7 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Flores v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv., 718 F.3d 548, 551 n.1 (6th Cir. 2013)). I employ the term in
the Article only “‘to be consistent with the statutory language’ that Congress has chosen and
‘to avoid any confusion in replacing a legal term of art with a more appropriate term.’” Id.

However, presidents of both political parties commonly assert broad executive powers in
the national security and immigration contexts, impinging on non-citizens and minorities’
rights. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE
PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 at 21–25, 40–41 (2012) [hereinafter GOLDSMITH, POWER AND
CONSTRAINT] (contending that the Obama administration largely accepted the Bush administration’s national security policies). The Trump administration’s arguments and policy at
issue in The Muslim Ban Case bear some similarity to preceding administrations. The Bush
administration commonly asserted that the President enjoyed unreviewable powers in responding to terrorist attacks. See, e.g., Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1299 (9th Cir.
2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 952 (2004) (observing that government’s theory permitted it to detain indefinitely, “and to do with . . . these detainees as it will, when it pleases, without any
compliance with any rule of law of any kind, without permitting [a detainee] to consult
counsel, and without acknowledging any judicial forum in which its actions may be challenged”). The Bush administration also conducted a program that required alien males over
the age of sixteen from twenty-four Muslim-majority states and North Korea to register
with the government and provide data enabling monitoring and immigration-law enforce5
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ident Trump’s two Supreme Court appointments—Brett Kavanaugh and
Neil Gorsuch—will likely cement for a generation the Court’s deferential
national security posture of negligibly limiting the Executive. 7 Third, Presiment. See generally Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholding National Security Entry–Exit Registration System (NSEERS) program). See also The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S.
Ct. at 2419, 2421 (citing Rajah in support of deference and history of government programs
applying to non-immigrant aliens from Muslim-majority countries); Kaveh Waddell, America
Already had a Muslim Registry, ATLANTIC (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2016/12/america-already-had-a-muslim-registry/511214/ [https://per
ma.cc/MW4M-3ULZ] (noting similarities between President-elect Trump’s proposed targeting of Muslims with, and possible expansion of, NSEERS). The Obama administration argued—in strikingly similar fashion to the Trump administration’s arguments in The Muslim
Ban Case—that courts could not review a State Department consulate official’s denial of a
visa to a citizen’s foreign spouse, even if there is “undeniable proof” of racist reasons for
the denial. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) (No. 131402)
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2014/131402_k536.pdf [https://perma.cc/3U2W-NM73]. Of course, President Obama’s most relevant executive acts here were his Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful
Permanent Residents (DAPA) and Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) programs. DAPA permitted illegal immigrants who were parents of citizens or lawful permanent residents to be lawfully present in United States. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal
of Undocumented Immigrants (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default
/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZSV8P43]. DACA authorized undocumented individuals who had entered the United States as
children to apply for deferral of removal. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who
Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xl
ibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.
pdf [https://perma.cc/EXF8-ADDG]. The Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court’s injunction against the DAPA’s implementation and DACA’s expansion, holding that the programs
exceeded the President’s authority. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir.
2015). An equally divided Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s judgment. United
States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (Mem.). As this article goes to publication, the Supreme Court is reviewing the Ninth Circuit’s decision that the Trump administration’s rescission of DACA was unlawful. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019). This unfavorable judicial treatment of executive
authority stands apart from most of the Court’s opinions on presidential power, raising
questions of whether the courts were motivated more by anti-immigrant and nativist impulses than concern over illegitimate exercise of power. On the other hand, civil-rights advocates readily embraced claims of discretionary executive power that were barely recognizable from the separation-of-powers arguments they marshaled in The Muslim Ban Case
and in other cases discussed in this article.
See The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2418–20 (discussing presidential authority to issue
Muslim ban).

6

7 See Helen Klein Murillo et al., Neil Gorsuch on National Security Law, LAWFARE (Feb. 1, 2017,
2:51 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/neil-gorsuch-national-security-law [https://pe
rma.cc/Y7WW-VEJJ] (inferring from then-Judge Gorsuch’s deferential decisions in the policing context that he would rule similarly in national security-related cases and noting his
“[n]arrow, but [d]eferential, [i]mmigration [r]ulings”); Jonathan Hafetz, Judge Kavanaugh’s Record in National-Security Cases,
SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 29, 2018, 11:02 AM),
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dent Trump has overhauled much of the federal judiciary, naming numerous judges to the lower courts who are not likely to sympathize with civilrights attorneys when it comes to the government’s stance on national security. 8 Civil-rights advocates, however, cannot simply capitulate to government policies that target and harm immigrants and minority groups.
Litigation may serve as a necessary corrective to executive overreach
and curtailment of marginalized groups’ civil liberties. Filing lawsuits at the
early stages of the Muslim ban rollout enabled thousands of people to enter
the United States and forestall their forcible return to other nations.9 Civilrights groups have seen their prominence rise, largely due to their ramped
up litigation efforts against Trump. 10 But in litigating, these organizations
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/08/judge-kavanaughs-record-in-national-security-cases
/ [https://perma.cc/C7ZV-L4JW] (surveying then-Judge Kavanaugh’s national security
opinions and describing his jurisprudence as has having “consistently articulated a broad
view of executive power, a narrow conception of the judiciary’s role (at least absent express
instruction by Congress), and skepticism toward the enforcement of individual rights under
the Constitution.”).
See Burgess Everett & Marianne Levine, McConnell Preps New Nuclear Option to Speed Trump
Judges, POLITICO (Mar. 6, 2019, 7:45 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/201
9/03/06/trump-mcconnell-judges-1205722 [https://perma.cc/X34E-4UEC]
(noting
Trump’s appointment of “roughly 20 percent of the Circuit Court seats in the country after
just two years in office” has resulted in “few, if any, vacancies there for a potential Democratic president in 2021”). See also Thomas Kaplan, Trump is Putting Indelible Conservative Stamp
on
Judiciary,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
31,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com
/2018/07/31/us/politics/trump-judges.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickS
ource=story-heading&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news
(noting that President Trump had more circuit court nominees confirmed “than any other
president had secured at this point in his presidency since the creation of the regional circuit
court system in 1891”).

8

See, e.g., Maeve Higgins, Opinion, God Bless America, and Her Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/26/opinion/sunday/immigration-lawyerstravel-ban.html (discussing civil-rights advocates efforts to support refugees and immigrants
from the seven majority Muslim countries banned by President Trump).
9

Anthony D. Romero, Here Is the ACLU’s 7-Point Plan of Action to Take on the Trump Administration, ACLU (Jan. 19, 2017, 9:15 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/civilliberties/executive-branch/here-aclus-7-point-plan-action-take-trump-administration [https
://perma.cc/4FBZ-JDUW] (“We will be the David to the federal government’s Goliath.
The ACLU has 300 litigators, spread out among our national headquarters and each of the
50 states.”). See also Joel Lovell, Can the A.C.L.U. Become the N.R.A. for the Left?, N.Y. TIMES
(July 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/02/magazine/inside-the-aclus-war-ontrump.html (quoting ACLU Executive Director Anthony Romero on how litigation and
public advocacy caused the Trump administration to back down on its family separation
policy); Liam Stack, Donations to A.C.L.U. and Other Organizations Surge After Trump’s Order,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/us/aclu-fund-raisingtrump-travel-ban.html (describing ACLU and National Immigration Law Center’s increase
in number and size of donations). In the fifteen months after the election, ACLU memberships more than quadrupled from 400,000 to 1.84 million and annual donations increased
from between $3 and $5 million to $120 million). Lovell, supra.

10
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may want to consider approaches that avoid constitutional issues in favor
of statutory claims. In fashioning such claims litigants may avoid precedents with wider constitutional repercussions and confine holdings to respective legislation. They also may want to prioritize individual clients over
impact litigation and policy challenges, seek out settlements, and forego
appealing to the Supreme Court should they lose in lower courts. Ultimately, however, civil-rights advocates should not limit their appeals to the
courtroom.
Civil-rights advocates must not abandon litigation as an advocacy tool,
but they should explore other means, concentrating, for example, on electoral efforts at both the congressional and presidential levels. 11 Congress, as
a political branch, may be better positioned to act as a check on the President. Indeed, in one of its less equivocal rejections of post-9/11 national
security policies, the Court struck down the Defense Department’s military
commissions largely because it violated congressionally-passed Uniform
Code of Military Justice provisions. 12 On the other hand, Congress (especially a veto-proof majority) has rarely sought to restrain the President in
his execution of national security related powers, deferring in a fashion
similar to the judiciary. 13 The indefinite and expanding nature of national
11 See Faiz Shakir, How the ACLU Plans to Engage in the 2018 Midterm Elections, ACLU (Jan. 11,
2018, 11:45 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/mobilization/how-aclu-plans-engage-2018midterm-elections [https://perma.cc/R8MJ-TRYS] (describing how “the ACLU plans to do
electoral work in a serious way for the first time” but remain non-partisan). See also Shadi
Hamid, The Travel Ban, the Law, and What’s ‘Right’, ATLANTIC (June 28, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/06/trump-travel-ban-supreme-court/56
4044/ [https://perma.cc/JTD2-FB26] (characterizing The Muslim Ban Case as “correct,”
though perhaps not “right,” and proposing that instead of litigating “[m]oral judgments on
constitutionally and legally muddy debates . . .” advocates are better served by “ . . . persuading as many of our fellow citizens that they should stop voting for anti-Muslim presidents.”).

See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006). Some scholars have questioned
whether the decision actually hinged on a congressional limitation, viewing the military
commissions as a constitutionally suspect executive action taken in the absence of congressional action. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 704
(2008).
12

A new Democratically controlled House of Representatives may embrace legislation limiting the Executive’s military-related powers, but whether a full Congress will ultimately enact
such laws is doubtful. See Bryan Bender & Gregory Hellman, Democrats Vow New Scrub of
Post-9/11 War Powers, POLITICO (Dec. 24, 2018, 7:14 AM), https://www.politico.com/sto
ry/2018/12/24/democrats-911-war-powers-military-1074808
[https://perma.cc/8YBNVYR7] (addressing congressional interest in revising the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, which three presidents have relied on when executing military action well beyond responding to the 9/11 terrorist attacks). Congress did vote to terminate the President’s recent emergency declaration intended to obtain border-wall funding, but the
President vetoed the legislation. Ben Jacobs, Trump Overrules Congress with Veto to Protect Border
Emergency Declaration, GUARDIAN (Mar. 15, 2019, 5:24 PM), https://www.theguar
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8

The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice

[23:2020]

security threats and the concomitant concentration and expansion of power in the executive branch demands civil-rights advocates’ increased attention to the electoral process.
Advocacy groups should also continue to concentrate on local and
group-minded expressions of dissent. The embrace of refugees and protests against the Muslim ban—often spearheaded by community and religious groups—offer a vision of American society distinct from the Court’s
highly statist and executive-led structure, which more often than not, discounts the rights of non-citizens. These extra-legal sources provide a more
inclusive basis for a national identity, which may eclipse an entrenchedrights framework that disfavors marginalized groups, particularly immigrant
populations in national security contexts.
This article contends that The Muslim Ban Case confirms the judiciary’s
endorsement of the executive branch’s increasing aggrandizement of power
in the national-security and immigration context, resulting in violations of
non-citizens’ freedoms and interests. In seeking to vindicate non-citizens’
rights in court, litigants instead may invite the Supreme Court’s validation
of executive branch policies. Rather than run to the courts, this article argues that advocates should explore varied approaches outside litigation that
channels a broader understanding of national identity that might embrace
foreign family members and refugees. Part I addresses the case against litigation, by examining how The Muslim Ban Case is no aberration, but rather
is the product of a national security jurisprudence upholding executive
branch polices and is a harbinger of future judicially validated civil-rights
violations. Part I also addresses several problematic aspects shared by The
Muslim Ban Case and other national security cases, which illustrate the danger of the Supreme Court’s review. Part II considers legal scholarship cautioning against advocacy that relies heavily on litigation. Part II also discusses how legal advocacy groups in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian
Territories either abandoned litigation or considered doing so after they
found that the Israeli High Court of Justice legitimated the government’s
occupation policies and practices. Part IV addresses the case for litigation
in the face of these specific and general concerns. Part IV proposes several
strategies civil-rights advocates and attorneys should consider when weighing and waging litigation in the national security context. Part IV concludes
with a series of extra-judicial advocacy proposals, which includes an alternative framework to the confining legal rights model that litigants invariably adopt in court.

dian.com/us-news/2019/mar/15/trump-veto-national-emergency-declaration-resolution-se
nate [https://perma.cc/YH5V-V4WJ].
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II. THE SPECIFIC CASE AGAINST LITIGATION
The Muslim Ban Case illustrates the lengths to which the Court defers to
the President in the context of national security context. After purporting
to consider President Trump and his advisors’ numerous anti-Muslim
statements in connection with the Muslim ban, the Court upheld Proclamation No. 9645 14 because, on its face, the ban supported legitimate national
security interests. 15 The Court acknowledged the record evidencing the
President’s animus toward Muslims, but ultimately found that, independent
of its history, the Proclamation was a neutral and rational means to further
security interests and therefore the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on
their Establishment Clause claim. 16 The Court’s inclination to divorce presidential policy from its starkly discriminatory motivations and intent lays
bare the illusory limitations that constrain the President. At the very least,
individual rights—particularly those of the most marginalized and unpopular—hold little consequence to the Court when the President invokes national security. 17
Although the case is unique in that no prior Executive had so transparently and amply provided id-fueled, tweet-filled insights into a policy’s discriminatory purposes, the opinion’s reasoning inexorably follows from the
Court’s earlier pronouncements on national security policies. Thus, The
Muslim Ban Case is not an anomaly; it is a warning of what is to come. Accordingly, the opinion presents a useful case study for examining the problematic features of the Court’s national security jurisprudence that may militate against future civil-rights litigation. The following discusses these
common features.

Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the
United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats, Proclamation No. 9645, 3 CFR
§ 135 (2018).

14

15

Trump v. Hawaii (The Muslim Ban Case), 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420–23 (2018).

See id. at 2423 (“[T]he Government has set forth a sufficient national security justification
to survive rational basis review. We express no view on the soundness of the policy. We
simply hold today that plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their constitutional claim.”).

16

In contrast, only weeks prior to The Muslim Ban Case opinion, the Court held that state
government officials’ statements reflected unacceptable anti-religious animus against a
Christian baker who refused to customize a wedding cake for a same-sex couple. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018) (“The official expressions of hostility to religion in some of the commissioners’ comments—
comments that were not disavowed at the Commission or by the State at any point in the
proceedings that led to the affirmance of the order—were inconsistent with what the Free
Exercise Clause requires.”). See infra Part IV.C.5 (discussing inconsistencies between Masterpiece and The Muslim Ban Case).

17
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A. Deference
The Court echoed its prior holdings that courts should exercise deference in weighing the President’s national security and immigration decisions, explaining that “our inquiry into matters of entry and national security is highly constrained.” 18 Courts have frequently justified their supine
review on any number of considerations, including the action or precipitating event’s temporary or emergent nature, the international or foreign affairs dimension, and the issue’s complexity, imprecision, or secrecy. 19
The Court relied, for example, on Ziglar v. Abbasi, which held that executive officials enjoy immunity from lawsuits brought by non-citizens
abused while in detention immediately following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 20 The Court rejected the former detainees’ lawsuit, in part, because
judicial review of the executive branch’s national security decisions intrudes
on constitutional separation of powers.21
Similarly, the Court relied on Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, which
held that teaching international law to members of a terrorist organization
constitutes material support of terrorism. 22 There the Court deferred to
government assertions about threats posed by such teaching due to the judiciary’s “lack of competence” in “collecting evidence and drawing inferences” regarding “questions of national security.”23
These precedents and their citation foretold The Muslim Ban Case’s predictable outcome and reflect the jurisprudence at the nexus of national security and non-citizens. The Court’s deferential default produces inevitably
limited inquiries and standards of review favorable to the government,
maximizing presidential authority and minimizing injury to minority
groups’ legal interests. And the reasoning itself only reinforces and calcifies
the deferential posture for future national security cases.
The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2420. See also id. at 2419 (“Mandel’s narrow standard of
review ‘has particular force’ in admission and immigration cases that overlap with ‘the area
of national security.’” (quoting Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2140 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).

18

19

See Cover, Presumed Imminence, supra note 3, at 1453–55 (discussing cases).

20

The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2419; Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1869 (2017).

21

Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1861.

22 The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2419; Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1,
40 (2010).

The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2419 (quoting Holder, 561 U.S. at 34). The Court also
relied on precedents of deference that predate the post-9/11 era. See, e.g., id. at 2421 (“But
we cannot substitute our own assessment for the Executive’s predictive judgments on such
matters, all of which ‘are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy.’”)
(quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)).
23
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B. Heightened Executive Power
The Court frequently premises its deferential analysis on the relative
skill and expertise of the political branches. 24 In The Muslim Ban Case, the
Court elevated the abstract power of the presidency over the particular actions of President Trump. In so doing it made the case for a stronger presidency and downplayed the President’s precise conduct. While purporting
to give equal weight to the general and specific—“we must consider not
only the statements of a particular President, but also the authority of the
Presidency itself”—the Court ultimately paid little heed to President
Trump’s remarks.25 The opinion thus retains an air of unreality, trafficking
in the theoretical over the concrete and circumscribing any problematic evidence through the forgiving lens applied to presidential actions. 26
The Court’s paean to executive power also reads gratuitously, divorced
from its earlier analysis in the opinion where it held that, under 8 U.S.C. §
1182(f), Congress authorized the President to issue the proclamation.27 It
may be implicit that the Court considered the President to act at his height
of powers under the Youngstown analysis because of the congressional
grant. 28 But the focus on presidential authority in the abstract when addressing the Establishment Clause claim, without reference to Congress,
comes dangerously close to endorsing Justice Thomas’s view that “the
President has inherent authority to exclude aliens from the country.” 29 Ele-

See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008) (noting that “neither the Members of
this Court nor most federal judges begin the day with briefings that may describe new and
serious threats to our Nation and its people”); Holder, 561 U.S. at 35 (describing political
branches as “uniquely positioned” to assess how particular activities relate to and impact
terrorism and foreign policy).
24

25

The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2418.

Id. (“But the issue before us is not whether to denounce the statements. It is instead the
significance of those statements in reviewing a Presidential directive, neutral on its face, addressing a matter within the core of executive responsibility.”).

26

27

Id. at 2408.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson’s three situations and “legal consequences” is the dominant model
courts utilize in assessing presidential power in foreign affairs. In the first category, the President’s “authority is at its maximum” when he “acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress,” requiring the “widest latitude of judicial interpretation.” Id. at
635–37. The second category is “a zone of twilight” where the President and Congress may
or may not enjoy “concurrent authority.” Id. at 637. Here, the President acts on his “independent” authority, without “either a congressional grant or denial of authority.” Id. Finally,
the President’s “power is at its lowest ebb” when he acts in a way “incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress,” demanding that such measures “be scrutinized with
caution.” Id. at 637–38.

28

29

The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2424 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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vating presidential authority on such ambiguous bases, separate from constitutionally express or implied grants, “invite[s] political abuse and endanger[s] individual liberties.”30 Clarity on the President’s source of power is
therefore vital.
C. Diminished Harm
In addition to elevating executive authority, the Court’s deference entails minimizing the harm suffered by litigants. Absent from The Muslim Ban
Case is any serious discussion of the policy’s motivations or its impact on
the plaintiffs and others similarly situated. In a not so subtle fashion, the
Court pushes aside the victims—American Muslims and their family members.
First, the Court’s review of the record is cursory at best. Though the
Court acknowledged that, “[a]t the heart of plaintiffs’ case is a series of
statements by the President and his advisers casting doubt on the official
objective of the Proclamation[,]” 31 the Court devoted only three brief paragraphs to the statements.32 In contrast to the majority’s “highly abridged
account,” 33 Justice Sotomayor’s dissent documents the statements in numerous paragraphs, bringing the Proclamation’s background of antiMuslim animus to the forefront. 34
These statements are not inscrutable, but egregious in their focus on,
and malice toward, Muslims:
As part of his presidential campaign, then candidate
Trump issued a press release, stating: “Donald J.
Trump is calling for a total and complete shutdown of
Muslims entering the United States . . . .” 35

Louis Fisher, The Unitary Executive and Inherent Executive Power, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 569,
589 (2010).

30

31

The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2417.

32

See id.

33

Id. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

34

See id. at 2435–38.

35 Proposed Third Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 54, Hawaii v. Trump, 258 F. Supp. 3d 1188 (D. Haw. 2017) (No. 1:17-cv00050-DKW-KSC),
https://www.hoganlovells.com/~/media/hogan-lovells/pdf/hawaii/2017_10_10_367_1_
proposed_third_amended_complaint_and_inj.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3U8-N9PM] [hereinafter, Proposed Third Amended Complaint] (quoting Press Release, Donald J. Trump for
President, Donald J. Trump Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration (Dec. 7, 2015)).
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Candidate Trump said, “I think Islam hates us . . . we
can’t allow people coming into this country who have
this hatred of the United States . . . [a]nd of people
that are not Muslim.” 36
Responding to the suggestion that he might be rolling
back the Muslim ban idea, candidate Trump stated,
“I’m looking now at territories. People were so upset
when I used the word Muslim. Oh, you can’t use the
word Muslim. Remember this. And I’m okay with
that, because I’m talking territory instead of Muslim.” 37
After President Trump signed the first Executive Order iteration of the ban, his legal advisor Rudy Giuliani explained, “[W]hen [Mr. Trump] first announced it,
he said, ‘Muslim ban.’ He called me up. He said, ‘Put a
commission together. Show me the right way to do it
legally.’” 38
In response to the Supreme Court’s partial injunction
of the second Executive Order implementing the ban,
President Trump described the order as a “watered
down version of the first one,” adding, “I think we
ought to go back to the first one and go all the way,
which is what I wanted to do in the first place.”39
Among his many statements on Twitter supporting
the Muslim ban, President Trump tweeted: “The travel ban into the United States should be far larger,
36Id.

at ¶ 57 (quoting Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees: Exclusive Interview with Donald Trump, CNN
(Mar. 9, 2016, 8:00 PM), http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1603/09/acd.01.html [htt
ps://perma.cc/TDA3-23W5]).

37 Id. at ¶ 62 (quoting Meet the Press with Chuck Todd, NBC (July 24, 2016),
https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/meet-press-july-24-2016-n615706 [https://per
ma.cc/W322-NPD3]).
38 Id. at ¶ 70 (quoting Amy B. Wang, Trump Asked for a ‘Muslim Ban,’ Giuliani Says—and Ordered a Commission to Do It ‘Legally’, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/29/trump-asked-for-a-musl
im-ban-giuliani-says-and-ordered-a-commission-to-do-it-legally/ [https://perma.cc/LBS4-3
HSV]).
39 Id. at ¶ 84 (quoting Katie Reilly, Read President Trump’s Response to the Travel Ban Ruling: It
‘Makes Us Look Weak’, TIME (Mar. 16, 2017), https://time.com/4703622/president-trumpspeech-transcript-travel-ban-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/V372-V5V9]).
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tougher and more specific[] but stupidly, that would
not be politically correct!”40
Despite the teeming public record, the Court did not actually consider
the impact of these statements. The majority opinion explained it “may
consider plaintiffs’ extrinsic evidence,” 41 but that “we must consider not
only the statements of a particular President,” 42 and that “the only question
is evaluating the actions of this particular President in promulgating an otherwise valid Proclamation.” 43 But it rejected the plaintiffs’ formulation of
the harm—that “this President’s words strike at fundamental standards of
respect and tolerance, in violation of our constitutional tradition.”44 Instead, the Court limited its inquiry to “the significance of those statements
in reviewing a Presidential directive, neutral on its face, addressing a matter
within the core of executive responsibility.” 45
The Court’s contextualization explains in part a standard of review that
necessarily ignores the fact and import of the President’s statements. The
Court’s holding that the plaintiffs had standing because of their separation
from family, rather than from any dignitary and spiritual harm, might seemingly justify looking away from the anti-Muslim statements and focusing
instead on the abstracted question of the denial of entry to foreign nationals. 46 Though the Court’s remarks on executive power read anodyne, the
larger legal meaning is severe and substantive: American Muslims’ Establishment Clause claims, even when alleging injuries of family disruption and
religious humiliation, are weak and of little import, even where religious animus motivates government policy.
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court similarly disregarded the plaintiffs’ allegations that federal government officials issued discriminatory policies resulting in the arrest and detention of thousands of Arab Muslim men after the
9/11 terrorist attacks. 47 In holding that the plaintiff’s allegations were implausible because they were “conclusory,” the majority characterized specifId. at ¶ 87 (quoting Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 15, 2017,
3:54 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/908645126146265090 [https://pe
rma.cc/FL4H-VGFR]).
40

41

Trump v. Hawaii (The Muslim Ban Case), 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420 (2018).

42

Id. at 2418.

43

Id. at 2423.

44

Id. at 2418.

45

Id.

46

See id. at 2416.

47

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009).
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ic paragraphs as “bare assertions” without considering the complaint as a
whole and numerous other paragraphs supporting the discrimination
claims. 48 The Court’s reading is particularly questionable given that, at the
motion-to-dismiss stage, the Court should have “assum[ed] that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” 49 Thus, the
Court often justifies its deference to the Executive on an inverse relationship between high presidential acumen and minimal impact on the targeted
population. The Court appears predisposed to ignore or explain away the
harms that outgroups suffer, creating a “willful-blindness” within the Supreme Court.
These “willful-blindness” features are present in the very case the
Court insisted has no connection with the Muslim ban and claimed to have
overruled. 50 In addressing Japanese-American citizen Fred Korematsu’s
conviction for violating the World War II-era military’s exclusion order
(which required the removal and detention of all citizens of Japanese ancestry), the Court also denied that the case was about animus: “[t]o cast this
case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real military
dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue. Korematsu was
not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his
race.” 51 There too the Court denied any racist element and then elevated
the security interests: war, military necessity, exigency, and political branch
determinations. 52 Just as The Muslim Ban Case Court cast aside or minimized
evidence of Trump’s anti-Muslim motivations, so too did the Korematsu
Court dilute or deny the consideration of race in the internment of Japanese-Americans. The Muslim Ban Case is another example of how even when
such animus is present, it does not offend the Constitution.

48 Id. The dissent saw the majority’s interpretation of the complaint’s facts as highly selective. See id. at 697–99 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The fallacy of the majority’s position, however, lies in looking at the relevant assertions in isolation. . . . Taking the complaint as a whole,
it gives Ashcroft and Mueller fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.”) (internal quotations omitted).

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). See also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 696 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that at this stage in the pleadings the allegations are assumed to
be true).

49

50 See The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2423 (“Korematsu has nothing to do with this case.
The forcible relocation of U.S. citizens to concentration camps, solely and explicitly on the
basis of race, is objectively unlawful and outside the scope of Presidential authority. But it is
wholly inapt to liken that morally repugnant order to a facially neutral policy denying certain
foreign nationals the privilege of admission.”).

Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944), abrogated by The Muslim Ban Case,
138 S. Ct. at 2423.

51

52

See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223–24.
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D. Weakening Standards
The Court altered several judicial standards of review in sustaining the
Muslim ban. The Court’s subverting of standards of review reflects a pattern in national security cases in which the Court crafts an outcomedeterminative standard of review that will not disturb the Executive’s policy. Of equal concern is whether the reduced standards of review may expand beyond the already ambiguously defined national security context to
other areas of law.53
The Court explicitly stated that it would not treat the plaintiffs’ claim
that the ban was motivated by religious animus as a “conventional Establishment Clause claim.” 54 The Court explained that the “national security
and foreign affairs context” affected the “scope of the constitutional right”
and “standard of review,” leading it to reject the Establishment Clause’s “de
novo ‘reasonable observer’ inquiry.” 55 In so doing, the Court minimized the
constitutional right asserted and departed entirely from established First
Amendment case law. The Court’s “national security and foreign affairs”
language suggests a limiting principle that might preclude applying the diluted standard to run-of-the-mill Establishment Clause cases. 56 But the
plaintiffs were not those seeking entry to the United States; they were
American citizens within the confines of the country. 57
The Court then claimed that the foreign affairs-national-security-entry
context should require it to apply “a more constrained standard of review,”
that requires “asking only whether the policy is facially legitimate and bona
fide.” 58 However, apparently because the government conceded at oral argument that reviewing the President’s disparaging comments was proper,
the Court acknowledged that it could “look behind the face of the Proclamation.” 59 Tellingly, the Court did not adopt Justice Kennedy’s 2015 controlling concurrence in Kerry v. Din, which held that courts should “look
behind” the proffered reasons of a Department of State consulate official’s
denial of a visa when there is “an affirmative showing of bad faith.” 60 JusSee Maryam Jamshidi, The Travel Ban: Part of a Broad National Security Exceptionalism in U.S.
Law, JUST SECURITY (July 3, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/58794/travel-ban-partbroad-national-security-exceptionalism-u-s-law/ [https://perma.cc/UB2V-V59F].

53

54

The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2418.

55

Id. at 2418, 2420 nn.5 & 6.

56

See id.

57

Id. at 2406.

58

Id. at 2420 & n.5.

59

Id.

60

Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

Quieting the Court

17

tice Kennedy’s level of review would have seemed warranted given the alleged liberty interests implicating the family relationship. 61
Instead, the Court deviated from even the “circumscribed review”
precedent, holding that its “look behind” would entail only “rational basis
review.” 62 It is possible to read the Court’s analysis as sui generis—a product of the government’s unique concession to reviewing past presidential
statements. But at the very least, the Court appeared to reject—at least by
omission—Justice Kennedy’s “look behind” analysis, also avoiding any determination that the extrinsic evidence rises to an “affirmative showing of
bad faith.” 63 The Court never once addressed its failure to utilize Justice
Kennedy’s analysis that is vital where plaintiffs credibly allege ill motive.
Finally, the Court also manipulated the traditional rational-basis review
it purported to apply. The Court explained that it “will uphold the policy so
long as it can reasonably be understood to result from a justification independent of unconstitutional grounds.”64 The Court did not, however, address the policy’s potentially discriminatory purposes; it was a one-sided
analysis that only considered the government’s arguments, inevitably permitting pretexts for discriminatory policies as legitimate interests.65 Indeed,
although the Court indicated it would review the statements, the Court’s
“highly abridged account” of the statements lacked any substantive discussion. 66
The Court also departed from the analytical approach it had utilized in
prior cases alleging discriminatory motivation. In these cases, the Court
considered both the government interests supporting the policy and the
challengers’ assertions of animus. For example, in Romer v. Evans, the Court
did not simply accept Colorado’s claims that the landlords’ freedom of association, discomfort with homosexuality, and preserving government re61

See infra Part IV.C.5.

62

The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2420.

See id. at 2440 & n.5 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Finally, even assuming that Mandel and
Din apply here, they would not preclude us from looking behind the face of the Proclamation because plaintiffs have made ‘an affirmative showing of bad faith,’ by the President
who, among other things, instructed his subordinates to find a ‘lega[l]’ way to enact a Muslim ban.”) (quoting Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2141).

63

Id. at 2420. The Court also appeared to depart from its long-held view that “[t]he Constitution’s guarantee of equality ‘must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to
harm a politically unpopular group cannot’ justify disparate treatment of that group.” United
States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770 (2013) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973)).

64

65

The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2420–23.

66

Id. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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sources to fight discrimination against other groups justified the state constitutional amendment’s prohibition on ordinances protecting the gay
community from discrimination. 67 Instead, the Court also considered and
weighed against these interests whether Amendment 2 was overbroad and
motivated by animosity toward the gay and lesbian community. 68
The Muslim Ban Case, despite its brief citation to a few of President
Trump’s anti-Islamic statements, never analyzed the statements as reflecting possible animus. Though the Court suggested that it would consider
“extrinsic evidence,” “look behind,” and “probe the sincerity of the stated
justifications for the policy,” the Court engaged in no such inquiry.69 The
Court found that the government’s reasons proffered for the Proclamation
were sufficient. But a judicial review that discounts evidence—as was in
ample supply here—of the “bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular
group” will inevitably accept any pretext and sanction the policy. 70
E. Precedent and Contagion
The Muslim Ban Case’s ambiguity as to what triggers its circumscribed
inquiry raises concerns about the clarity and scope of its applicability. The
opinion describes a wide arena in which the Executive may act with primacy and little restraint. The majority alternatively describes the context in
which the Muslim ban operates as “national security,” 71 “entry,” 72 “admission,”73 “immigration,”74 “international affairs,” 75 or “foreign affairs.” 76 In
some instances, these contexts overlap. These multiple triggers for increas-

67

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).

Id. at 631–34. See also Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
540–41 (1993) (addressing how plaintiffs may prove Establishment Clause, Free Exercise
Clause, and Equal Protection Clause violations with evidence of discriminatory purpose
through “the historical background of the decision under challenge, the specific series of
events leading to the enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative or administrative history”).
68

69

The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2420; id. at 2418.

70 Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
71

The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2409, 2419–20, 2422.

72

Id. at 2419–20.

73

Id. at 2419.

74

Id.

75

Id. at 2409.

Id. at 2419, 2422. See also id. at 2424 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (characterizing The Muslim
Ban Case as one entailing “the conduct of foreign affairs”).

76
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ing deference raise concerns about when the Court will modulate executive
action.
Whether The Muslim Ban Case will ultimately weaken Establishment
Clause, Equal Protection Clause, or immigration standards of review in different contexts remains to be seen. But the Court’s decisions in other national-security cases have had far-reaching consequences, impacting case
law in as routine areas as standing, pleading standards, and government
immunity.
In Iqbal, the Court articulated a parsimonious pleading standard for
what constituted “plausible” claims. 77 The post-9/11 detention context
and allegations against the Attorney General and FBI director likely influenced the new test.78 The Court appeared sympathetic to the unique situation and the federal defendants’ actions, rendering it less inclined to find
plausible a discriminatory motive in the detention rather than a common
sense decision.79 The terrorist-attacks context also may have led the Court
to heavily weigh the interference litigation might pose. 80 It may also explain
the Court’s gratuitous rejection of supervisory liability, an issue that the
government appeared to have conceded. 81 As a consequence of the opinion, plaintiffs in contexts far removed from national security matters now
face greater hurdles at the pleading stage. To be sure, the Court’s limitations on pleading standards is not solely a byproduct of national security
litigation. But this context may have played a precipitating or aggravating
role.
And in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the Court appeared to
tighten its Article III standing requirements, holding that plaintiffs’ fear of
the government’s interception of their communications under amendments
to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was too speculative, insisting
“that threatened injury must be ‘certainly impending . . . .’” 82 The Court
held the plaintiffs could not satisfy the requirement despite their showing
that their conduct fell within the ambit of the challenged act’s interceptive

77

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

See id. at 670 (noting Second Circuit Judge Jose Cabranes’s “concern at the prospect of
subjecting high-ranking Government officials—entitled to assert the defense of qualified
immunity and charged with responding to ‘a national and international security emergency
unprecedented in the history of the American Republic’—to the burdens of discovery on
the basis of a complaint as nonspecific as respondent’s.”) (citation omitted).

78

79

See id. at 679, 682.

80

See id. at 670, 685–86.

81

See id. at 683.

82

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401 (2013).
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scope, and the government’s past monitoring, motive, and capability to intercept such communications. 83 The national security context undoubtedly
influenced the Court, compelling it to explicitly note that “separation-ofpowers principles” called for judicial reticence. 84 But courts may not cabin
Clapper to the foreign intelligence gathering context. It is possible that the
opinion will have a “transsubstantive” effect, requiring a heightened showing for standing in a range of settings beyond national security and foreign
affairs. 85
Similar transsubstantive questions arise over the Bivens doctrine. 86 In
Abbasi, the Court clarified its already anemic and minimal implied damages
remedy for federal actors’ constitutional violations, holding that a Bivens
remedy did not extend to a post-9/11 detention policy. 87 Though future
litigants may attempt to distinguish Abbasi on its unique facts, the opinion
serves as yet another precedent that may limit federal government liability
beyond the national-security context.
It is too early to determine The Muslim Ban Case’s precedential breadth
for executive discretion in the security-immigration sphere and its limiting
principles. But lower courts have cited The Muslim Ban Case with approval
in deferring to executive actions in the military context 88 and denying equal
protection claims brought by parents of foreign nationals outside the United States who allege discrimination based on presidential statements.89 In
83 See id. at 408–10. See also id. at 427–31 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (recounting reasons government was likely to intercept plaintiffs’ communications and noting that “certainty is not, and
never has been, the touchstone of standing.”).

Id. at 408. See also id. at 409 (“[W]e have often found a lack of standing in cases in which
the Judiciary has been requested to review actions of the political branches in the fields of
intelligence gathering and foreign affairs”) (citations omitted).

84

85 See Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Clapper Opinion Recap: Supreme Court Denies Standing to Challenge
NSA
Warrantless
Wiretapping,
LAWFARE
(Feb.
26,
2013,
9:17
PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/clapper-opinion-recap-supreme-court-denies-standingchallenge-nsa-warantless-wiretapping

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397
(1971) (holding that persons injured by federal agents’ constitutional violation—here, of the
Fourth Amendment—may seek money damages in federal court).

86

87

Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1860–63 (2017).

See Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 755 F. App’x 19, 24–25 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (relying on
The Muslim Ban Case as support for its deferring to the military’s decision to exclude
transgender individuals from military service).
88

See generally S.A. v. Trump, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (holding that The Muslim Ban Case’s “circumscribed inquiry” applied to an equal protection challenge asserting discriminatory intent brought by parents legally within the United States whose children would
be denied entry into the country because of the termination of the Central American Minors
program). In S.A., the court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument “that the court should infer
from President Trump’s anti-Latino statements that the government acted with discrimina-

89
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contrast, other lower courts have restricted The Muslim Ban Case to circumstances that implicate the rights of foreign nationals seeking entry to the
United States 90 and national security or foreign policy concerns. 91 Other

tory animus and thus violated their equal-protection rights” because they relied on “cases
that do not involve the admission of foreign nationals into the United States. . . .” Id. at
1095. See also Gutierrez-Soto v. Sessions, 317 F. Supp. 3d 917, 930–31 (W.D. Tex. 2018)
(applying The Muslim Ban Case’s deferential standard to Mexican citizens’ equal protection
challenge to their detention and revocation of humanitarian parole by immigration officials).
90 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 519–20
(9th Cir. 2018) (holding The Muslim Ban Case inapposite and does not preclude plaintiffs’
constitutional challenge to the government’s rescission of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program based in part on “the physical location of the plaintiffs within the
geographic United States”), cert. granted, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019); Saget v. Trump, 375 F. Supp. 3d 280, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2019)
(holding “deferential standard employed in The Muslim Ban Case does not apply to . . . constitutional challenges to Haiti’s TPS [Temporary Protected Status] termination” brought by
Haitian nationals within the United States); New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F.
Supp. 3d 502, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (rejecting The Muslim Ban Case’s deferential standard for
analyzing plaintiffs’ claim that adding citizenship question to census violates equal protection under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. “It is one thing to uphold an Executive Branch decision that could ‘reasonably be understood to result from a justification
independent of’ an unconstitutional purpose in a context where the President exercises
nearly ‘plenary’ power.”) (citation omitted), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded on other
grounds, Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019); CASA de Md., Inc. v.
Trump, 355 F. Supp. 3d 307, 322–23 (D. Md. 2018) (rejecting The Muslim Ban Case’s deferential standard for analyzing Salvadoran nationals’ equal protection challenge to termination
of El Salvador’s TPS designation); Serv. Women’s Action Network v. Mattis, 352 F. Supp.
3d 977, 988 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (rejecting The Muslim Ban Case’s deferential standard as required for “reviewing military decisions” in analyzing women soldiers and marines’ equal
protection challenges to restrictive assignment policies and segregated training); Ramos v.
Nielsen, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1105–06 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (rejecting The Muslim Ban Case’s
deferential standard for analyzing Haitian, Nicaraguan, Salvadoran, and Sudanese nationals’
equal protection challenge to termination of their nations’ TPS designations); Presente v.
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 332 F. Supp. 3d 393, 411–12 (D. Mass. 2018) (rejecting The
Muslim Ban Case’s deferential standard for analyzing Haitian, Honduran, and Salvadoran nationals’ equal protection and due process challenge to termination of their nations’ TPS designations); NAACP v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 364 F. Supp. 3d 568, 576 (D. Md.
2019) (rejecting The Muslim Ban Case’s deferential standard for analyzing Haitian nationals’
equal protection challenge to termination of Haiti’s TPS designation). See also E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 909 F.3d 1219, 1249–50 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f)
(2018); Trump v. Hawaii (The Muslim Ban Case), 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2408 (2018) (rejecting government’s contention that “President’s authority to suspend aliens from entering the country, and to do so by proclamation” permitted President to deny eligibility for asylum to
those who illegally entered the country by not presenting themselves at a port of entry because “the rule of decision imposes the penalty on aliens already present within our borders”); Alison Frankel, Judges to DOJ: Don’t Overread Supreme Court’s Ruling in Trump v. Hawaii
(The
Muslim
Ban
Case),
REUTERS
(July
27,
2018,
1:47
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-otc-hawaii/judges-to-doj-dont-overreadsupreme-courts-ruling-in-trump-v-hawaii-idUSKBN1KH2DT (describing early lower court
decisions rejecting the government’s reliance on The Muslim Ban Case and observing “even
great victories can pale in exaggeration”).
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courts have distinguished the ban as a policy the President established under a broad grant of power from Congress. 92 Courts have also emphasized
the ban’s facial neutrality as to protected groups. 93 Some courts have also
stressed the “worldwide, multi-agency review” that the government purported to rely on in issuing the Proclamation to distinguish other restrictive
policies from falling under The Muslim Ban Case precedent. 94
Courts have also struggled over the degree to which The Muslim Ban
Case permits courts to consider extrinsic evidence under its deferential
standard of review. Some lower courts have stressed that the Supreme
Court’s “look behind” means that “[j]udicial review, though more deferential than traditional strict scrutiny, remains fact based.” 95 But other courts
have construed The Muslim Ban Case to direct a court reviewing matters relating to national security and foreign affairs not to “‘substitute’ [its] own
‘predictive judgments,’ or its own ‘evaluation of the underlying facts,’ for
those of the President.”96 Yet in the domestic context, lower courts have
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 908 F.3d at 520 (“[O]ur case differs from Hawaii in several
potentially important respects, including . . . the lack of a national security justification for
the challenged government action . . . .”); Saget, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 367; New York, 351 F.
Supp. 3d at 666 (“Nothing in the opinion indicates that this ‘circumscribed inquiry’ applies
outside of the ‘national security and foreign affairs context,’” and which, if applied more
broadly, “would decimate [Equal Protection] jurisprudence altogether”); CASA de Md., Inc.,
355 F. Supp. 3d at 323; Serv. Women’s Action Network, 352 F. Supp. 3d at 988; Ramos, 336 F.
Supp. 3d at 1105; Centro Presente, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 411–12; NAACP, 364 F. Supp. 3d at
576.
91

92

See, e.g., Ramos, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 1105–06.

Saget, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 367; Karnoski v. Trump, 328 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1160 (W.D.
Wash. 2018) (denying government motion for protective order in challenge to military service ban on openly transgender people).

93

See Karnoski, 328 F. Supp. 3d at 1160 (holding that The Muslim Ban Case does not preclude
discovery in lawsuit over military’s transgender ban).

94

Ramos, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 1108. See also Robinson v. Purkey, No. 3:17-cv-01263, 2018 WL
5023330, at *8 (M.D. Tenn. June 11, 2018) (“The Trump v. Hawaii court’s analysis, however,
was, if anything, notable for being particularly situationally-minded and fact-intensive.”). But
the nature and scope of review is hardly clear. As one district court noted, the Court failed
to “explain[] the precise contours of its inquiry.” Texas v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 3d
662, 708–09 (S.D. Tex. 2018) (“Trump v. Hawaii only speaks to the circumstances under
which a court may look behind the Executive’s discretionary exclusion of certain aliens to
determine whether the decision was motivated by unconstitutional reasons.”).
95

Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 917 F.3d 694, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (Williams, J., concurring) (quoting
Trump v. Hawaii (The Muslim Ban Case), 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2421–22 (2018)). Judge Williams
explained that The Muslim Ban Case’s deferential review—“uphold the [challenged] policy so
long as it can reasonably be understood to result from a justification independent of unconstitutional grounds”—should apply to a ban on transgender individuals serving in the military. Id. at 731 (alteration in original) (quoting The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2420). Judge
Williams reasoned that the lenient review should apply because inquiry into such national
security issues “‘raises concerns for the separation of powers’ by intruding on the Presi-
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also cited The Muslim Ban Case as reflecting an “evolving First Amendment
jurisprudence suggest[ing] that courts should consider the historical and
social context underlying a challenged government action to determine
whether the action was neutral or motivated by hostility toward religion.”97
Some scholars have argued that The Muslim Ban Case should not apply
to any number of immigrants-rights cases, including the Trump administration’s policies concerning the detention of asylum-seeking families and detainee abortion access.98 These scholars contend the case’s reach should be
limited to (1) its facts, which entailed “questions of motive and proof;” and
(2) its subject, which concerned “‘immigration policies’ (or perhaps immigration policies implicating national security).” 99
Despite several lower courts’ disinclination to extend The Muslim Ban
Case, the Supreme Court will likely have the final say on the opinion’s legacy. In fact, the Trump administration has frequently circumvented the
normal appeals process to obtain relief in the Supreme Court, attempting
to wrest sympathetic interpretive control at an earlier stage. 100
dent’s constitutional responsibilities” and “‘when it comes to collecting evidence and drawing inferences’ on questions of national security, ‘the lack of competence on the part of the
courts is marked.’” Id. at 732 (quoting The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2419). See also Yafai
v. Pompeo, 924 F.3d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 2019) (addressing visa application denial, holding
that, per Mandel and Din, “a reviewing court looks to the face of the order only” and noting
that “at the request of the government, [The Muslim Ban Case] Court assumed that it could
look behind the face of the order given the circumstances of that case. . . . [and] carefully
confined [that assumption] as one ‘for our purposes today’”); Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 755 F.
App’x 19, 24–25 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2421–22) (dissolving injunction against military’s transgender ban). However, at least one district court
held that, notwithstanding “significant similarities between the Court’s deference to Congress in military affairs and its deference to the President in immigration affairs. . . the Trump
[v. Hawaii] decision is tangential, at best, to” an equal protection challenge to male-only military draft registration requirement. Nat’l Coal. for Men v. Selective Serv. Sys., 355 F. Supp.
3d 568, 577 (S.D. Tex. 2019). The court therefore applied a heightened level of scrutiny. Id.
at 578 (citing Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 72 (1981)).
New Hope Family Servs., Inc. v. Poole, 387 F. Supp. 3d 194, 213 (N.D.N.Y. 2019); Moses v. Ruszkowski, No. S-1-SC-34974, 2018 WL 6566646, at *9 (N.M. Dec. 13, 2018).

97

See Adam Cox et al., The Radical Supreme Court Travel Ban Opinion–But Why It Might Not Apply to Other Immigrants’ Rights Cases, JUST SECURITY (June 27, 2018), https://www.justsecuri
ty.org/58510/radical-supreme-court-travel-ban-opinion-but-apply-immigrants-rights-cases/
[https://perma.cc/N4PX-R75S].

98

99 Id. Cox et al. further contend that the Muslim ban’s “doctrinal approach is irrelevant to
other cases, even if those cases involve the rights of noncitizens.” Id.

See Robert Barnes, Trump Officials Aggressively Bypass Appeals Process to Get Issues Before Conservative Supreme Court, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/courts_law/trump-officials-aggressively-bypass-appeals-process-to-get-issuesbefore-conservative-supreme-court/2018/10/23/ce38b9da-d612-11e8-83a2-d1c3da28d6b6
_story.html?utm_term=.94c234cb78d4 [https://perma.cc/SJP8-JE5J]. The Trump administration has not always been successful. The Supreme Court rejected a government request
100
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Still, no matter what factual and contextual limitations future courts
may apply to The Muslim Ban Case, they cannot fully cleanse its message.
The case holds that the chief federal officer may repeatedly utter the foulest
and most offensive statements about a particular minority group in support
of a policy that disproportionately targets these group members, and available legal remedies will not concern themselves with that animus.
F. Legitimacy
Civil-rights advocates often seek judicial review in order to curb government violations of individual rights. In doing so, they may animate the
checks and balances embedded in the constitutional structure. But as
Charles Black observed, the Court’s interpretation is more likely to uphold
the violation:
[T]he prime and most necessary function of the Court
has been that of validation, not that of invalidation. What a
government of limited powers needs, at the beginning and
forever, is some means of satisfying the people that it has
taken all steps humanly possible to stay within its powers.
That is the condition of its legitimacy, and its legitimacy,
in the long run, is the condition of its life. And the Court,
through its history, has acted as the legitimator of the government.101
Whatever its moral failings and limitations as precedent, The Muslim
Ban Case vindicates President Trump’s policy judicially. The Court provided
its legitimating stamp of approval, determining the ban is likely a constitutionally acceptable exercise of power. 102 The Court also may have validated
the ban by improving its most extreme features through a protracted legal
process in the lower courts, which it oversaw both through its engagement
and its silence. 103 As a result of the government’s changes, the third version
to stay a district court order enjoining the administration’s policy of holding ineligible for
asylum all immigrants who cross illegally into the United States from Mexico, while the government appeals to the Ninth Circuit. See Amy Howe, Justices Rebuff Government on Asylum
Ban, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 21, 2018, 3:56 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018
/12/justices-rebuff-government-on-asylum-ban/ [https://perma.cc/T28N-TTUY].
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE
DEMOCRACY 52 (1960).
101

AND THE

COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW

IN

A

102 See Hamid, supra note 11 (“[The Muslim Ban Case] contributes to the legitimization and
mainstreaming of anti-Muslim bigotry. That’s certainly how it will be interpreted by millions
of Americans.”).

Dara Lind, How Trump’s Travel Ban Became Normal, VOX (June 26, 2018, 10:43 AM),
https://www.vox.com/2018/4/27/17284798/travel-ban-scotus-countries-protests [https:/
/perma.cc/X8PR-PH2S].
103
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of the Muslim ban was still a ban, but different in form and asserted rationale, which enabled the Court to uphold its validity. Prior national security cases illustrate a comparable legitimacy-through-litigation process.
Jack Goldsmith argues that the limits on presidential power imposed
by “the GTMO habeas cases . . . also empowered the presidency and the
military, directly and indirectly. . . .”104 In Goldsmith’s account, civil-rights
advocates’ legal challenges to executive detention at Guantanamo, led to
the “ironic[]” and unintended consequences of securing indefinite detention in the rule of law. 105
Goldsmith explains that, “as a result of judicial and legislative interventions . . . there is no doubt now that these [executive counterterrorism]
practices are lawful and legitimate within the American constitutional system.” 106 The very fact of judicial and legislation consideration amounted
more to “caveats,” which “empowered” rather than weakened the presidency. 107 While allowing that “the courts and Congress imposed significant
constraints on these traditional practices by the Commander in Chief,”
Goldsmith argues that the Court’s limitations “also affirmed the legitimacy
of the practices in the round” and “placed these practices on a much firmer
foundation than they were during the early unilateralist era of George W.
Bush.” 108 Similarly, the Court’s rulings encouraged the political branches to
improve counterterrorism policies such as detention review. 109 But such
“improvements” were largely procedural, leaving detainees indefinitely at
Guantanamo. Thus, while the system of checks and balances “works,” it
fails to fundamentally alter the Executive’s actions or substantively protect
individuals’ civil rights. 110

104

GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT, supra note 5, at 194.

105

Id. at 196.

106

Id. at 194.

107

Id.

Id. at 195. The successive Obama administration adopted many of these practices, further
entrenching certain U.S. counterterrorism policies. See id. The Court’s sanctioning of many
of these policies may have impelled Obama to continue these policies because they were
now legally “approved.” Id.
108

See id. at 231. Goldsmith further contends that while the Executive has amassed greater
power after the 9/11 attacks, corresponding accountability and transparency mechanisms
such as inspectors general, litigants, politics, and the press operate effectively, which “belies
the many apocalyptic claims that we are living in an era of unrestrained presidential power.”
Id. at 48, 252.
109

See Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. REV.
1013, 1016 (2008) (observing that “‘war on terror’ litigation in U.S. courts has been fixated
on process to a degree that is peculiar . . . and there is something particular about American
legal culture at this moment in time that provides at least part of th[e] explanation”); id. at

110
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Others are not as sanguine as Goldsmith about the Court’s contributions, arguing that its opinions support only the modest proposition that
where particular liberties are implicated some sort of process must be afforded. 111 Though the Court famously intoned after the 9/11 terrorist attacks that “a state of war is not a blank check for the President,” the
Court’s national security opinions often only establish some modicum of
its own jurisdiction, but afford little protection for individual rights, particularly non-citizens’ rights. 112
Decisions based on Separation of Powers principles rather than the Bill
of Rights similarly offer little protection for the targets and victims of national security policies. 113 Thus, the Court’s invalidation of the military
commissions in Hamdan, for example, amounted to much less a victory for
detainee fair-trial rights, and more an insistence on legislative authorization
of the tribunals. 114 Ongoing detention at Guantanamo, the D.C. Circuit’s
resistance to releasing detainees, and resumption of military commissions
under congressional authorization reveal the Guantanamo opinions’ limitations. The state of affairs reflects the hollowness and risk of litigated solutions. 115
Regarding jurisdiction, The Muslim Ban Case is similar to other “judicial
victories” in that the Court rejected the government’s arguments based on
the consular non-reviewability doctrine that the challenge to the travel ban

1092 (“Unfortunately, the ‘war on terror’ litigation thus far seems to have resulted in a great
deal of process, and not much justice.”).
111 See Joseph Margulies & Hope Metcalf, Terrorizing Academia, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 433, 448–
49 (2010); Martinez, supra note 110, at 1014–15.

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004). Critically, the rest of the “blank-check”
sentence reads: “. . . when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.” Id. (emphasis added). See also id. at 533 (holding “that a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as
an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair
opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker”)
(emphasis added).
112

See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Passive-Aggressive Virtues, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 122,
127–30 (2011).

113

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Nothing prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary.”). See Martinez, supra note 110, at 1030.
114

See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, The New Judicial Deference, 92 B.U. L. REV. 89, 165 (2012)
(“In the terrorism cases, the Supreme Court appeared to expand its powers, stand up to the
political branches, and change the course of the anti-terror campaign by announcing that the
President was constrained by law. . . . The Court’s public decisions disguised the small effects they actually had because the petitioners could not get much benefit from these rulings
without more, much more.”).
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was not justiciable. 116 The Court resisted government contentions that because aliens had no right to enter the United States and that excluding aliens was “a fundamental act of sovereignty” by a political branch, courts
could only review exclusions where Congress so expressly authorized. 117
But judicial review is not a vindication of the rights asserted. 118 The Court
“assume[d] without deciding” that it could review the plaintiffs’ statutory
claims. 119 In addition, the Court held that it had jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge, finding they had standing based on the travel
ban’s prohibition on their relatives’ entry.120
See Trump v. Hawaii (The Muslim Ban Case), 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2407 (2018). The Court noted that the government had not identified any provision in the Immigration and Nationality
Act that expressly stripped the Court of jurisdiction over the statutory claims. Id. (citing
Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153 (2013)).
116

117

Id. (quoting U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542–543 (1950)).

See BLACK, supra note 101, at 52. The ongoing litigation saga over jurisdiction and detainee rights at Guantanamo Bay evidences the less than inevitable relationship between justiciability and rights and remedies. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483 (2004) (holding that
courts have statutory jurisdiction to review Guantanamo Bay detainees’ habeas claims but
failing to address potential constitutional violations). It would take another four years before
the Court held that the Constitution’s Suspension Clause applied at Guantanamo, and that
the Detainee Treatment Act was “an inadequate substitute for habeas corpus.” Boumediene
v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771–72 (2008). But detainees languish at Guantanamo still. The
Court has repeatedly denied detainees’ subsequent petitions for certiorari over the continuing congressional and constitutional bases for detention. See, e.g., al-Alwi v. Trump, 139 S.
Ct. 1893, 1894 (2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“al-Alwi faces the real
prospect that he will spend the rest of his life in detention based on his status as an enemy
combatant a generation ago, even though today’s conflict may differ substantially from the
one Congress anticipated when it passed the AUMF,” and prior armed conflicts that influenced international humanitarian law) (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004)
(plurality opinion)).

118

The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2407. As the Court observed, it had previously confronted similar arguments that courts could not review political branch decisions relating to
the exclusion of aliens. Id. Then and here, the Court did not directly address the judicial review argument but decided the merits of the statutory claim. See id. (citing Sale v. Haitian
Ctr. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993)). In Sale, the Court ultimately held that statutory and
treaty prohibitions on returning refugees to countries where they face likely persecution did
not apply in international waters, thus upholding an executive order directing the interdiction of Haitian boats and forced repatriation of passengers without determining their refugee status. Sale, 509 U.S. at 159. See also id. at 188 (“Acts of Congress normally do not have
extraterritorial application unless such an intent is clearly manifested. That presumption has
special force when we are construing treaty and statutory provisions that may involve foreign and military affairs for which the President has unique responsibility.” (citing United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)).
119

120 The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2416. The Court found that “a person’s interest in being united with his relatives is sufficiently concrete and particularized to form the basis of an
Article III injury in fact.” Id. The Court might have held that it lacked jurisdiction because
the Establishment Clause did not afford the plaintiffs “a legally protected interest in the
admission of particular foreign nationals.” Id. See Marty Lederman, Contrary to Popular Belief,
the Court Did Not Hold That the Travel Ban Is Lawful—Anything But. (Which Makes Its Ruling,
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The judicial process, including the Court’s direct involvement, pushed
the government to amend, validate, and possibly sanitize the Muslim
ban. 121 The first iteration of the Muslim ban was hastily issued within one
week of President Trump’s inauguration and addressed foreign national entry in several extraordinary ways. The Executive Order (1) banned entry of
seven majority-Muslim countries’ nationals, specifically from Iran, Iraq,
Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen; (2) applied to nationals who had
already been issued visas; (3) applied to lawful permanent residents;
(4) applied to dual nationals; (5) reduced the intake of refugees from
110,000 to 55,000; (6) indefinitely suspended entry of all Syrian refugees;
(7) banned all other refugees’ entry for 120 days; and (8) directed officials
to prioritize refugee claims of religious minorities facing persecution
(which appeared to select Christian minorities for special protections). 122
The rollout of the order led to detentions of hundreds, chaos at airports,
panic for thousands of foreign nationals and their family members, as
well as public protests, multiple lawsuits, and the firing of the attorney
general for refusing to defend the order. 123

Justice Kennedy’s Deference, and the President’s Enforcement of the Ban Even More Indefensible.),.),
BALKANIZATION (July 2, 2018), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2018/07/contrary-to-popularbelief-court-did.html [https://perma.cc/ZH27-SHYT]. But the Court held that the question
went to the merits rather than justiciability. See The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2416; infra
Part IV.C.5.
See generally Lind, supra note 103 (observing that changes to the ban over the course of
litigation “normalized” the policy, which likely influenced the Supreme Court’s ruling). See
also Timeline of the Muslim Ban, ACLU WASH., https://www.aclu-wa.org/pages/timelinemuslim-ban [https://perma.cc/F5HP-NXRL] (last visited Dec. 27, 2019) (providing a timeline of the Muslim ban and related litigation).
121

Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017). See Exec. Order No. 13,780,
82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017).
122

123 See Litigation Documents
& Resources Related to the Travel Ban, LAWFARE,
https://www.lawfareblog.com/litigation-documents-resources-related-travel-ban
[https://perma.cc/ZF6E-42R5] (last updated Dec. 23, 2018) (providing documents from
various cases litigating the Muslim ban as of December 23, 2018); Aaron Blake, Trump’s
Travel Ban is Causing Chaos—and Putting His Unflinching Nationalism to the Test, WASH. POST
(Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/29/presi
dent-trumps-travel-ban-is-causing-chaos-dont-expect-him-to-back-down/?utm_term=.ecdd
6c2f8beb [https://perma.cc/9JML-LGC9]; Ryan Lizza, Why Sally Yates Stood Up to Trump,
NEW YORKER (May 22, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/29/whysally-yates-stood-up-to-trump [https://perma.cc/A7HJ-RY6X]. See generally CENTER FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS & YALE LAW SCHOOL RULE OF LAW CLINIC, WINDOW DRESSING
THE MUSLIM BAN: REPORTS OF WAIVERS AND MASS DENIALS FROM YEMENI-AMERICAN
FAMILIES STUCK IN LIMBO (June 2018), https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/atta
ch/2018/06/CCR_YLS_June2018_Report_Window-Dressing-the-Muslim-Ban.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/N53A-3WYU] (documenting ongoing challenges that Yemeni-American families
face due to ban); Letter from Cardozo Law Clinics et al., to John Roth, DHS Inspector general, Abuses in the Aftermath of the Executive Order on Immigration (Feb. 6, 2017),
https://cardozo.yu.edu/news/cardozo-report-abuses-aftermath-executive-order-
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The general uniformity of successful legal challenges 124 prompted the
government to issue a new order only six weeks later. 125 In court, the
government explained that the new order “clarifies and narrows the scope
of Executive action regarding immigration, extinguishes the need for emergent consideration, and eliminates the potential constitutional concerns . . .
.” 126 The Second Executive Order fixed some of the prior order’s more
egregious errors. The revised Muslim ban (1) removed Iraq (a close U.S.
ally) from the banned countries; (2) clarified that the ban applied only to
foreign nationals outside the United States who lacked a proper visa at
the time of the first ban’s issuance; (3) exempted lawful permanent residents, dual nationals, and certain foreign nationals previously granted entry (including asylum); (4) provided for waivers on a case-by-case basis;
and (5) removed from the refugee restrictions the “religious minority”
exemption and the Syria-specific ban. 127 Despite the changes, lower
courts continued to enjoin the Muslim ban’s enforcement nationwide. 128
In June 2017, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. In addition to
granting the government’s petitions, the Court allowed portions of the
ban to go into effect, though not as to persons with a “bona fide relationship” to family members or particular entities in the United States. 129
In September 2018, President issued a third version of the Muslim
ban. 130 The Proclamation removed Sudan from the list of banned countries
but added Chad, North Korea, and some Venezuelan nationals to the
banned list of majority-Muslim nations. 131 After district courts granted preliminary injunctions, the Supreme Court granted stays pending both the
immigration (documenting twenty-six accounts of alleged abuses and violations suffered by
immigrant detainees at airports due to initial ban).
See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3,
2017), appeal dismissed, No. 17-35105, 2017 WL 3774041 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539 (D. Md.), aff’d in part, vacated in
part, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017), and vacated and remanded
sub nom. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017).
124

125

See Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209.

Order Granting Motion for Temporary Restraining Order at 8–9, Hawai’i v. Trump, CV.
NO. 17-00050 DKW-KSC (D. Haw. Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/legaldocument/state-hawaii-and-ishmael-elshikh-vs-donald-j-trump-et-al-order [https://perma.c
c/Q28L-7UY3] (citation omitted).
126

127

See Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209.

128

See, e.g., Hawai’i v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1123 (D. Haw. 2017).

129

See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. at 2088.

130

See Proclamation No. 9645, 3 CFR § 135 (2018).

131

See id.
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government’s appeals to the Fourth and Ninth Circuits and petitions for
certiorari, allowing the third version of the ban to go into effect. 132
In addition to the substantive changes to the ban, the government offered more detailed security justifications for the restrictions with each iteration. 133 The third ban, in particular, delineated how a “worldwide review”
and multi-agency process led to the Proclamation’s identification of countries and limitations on entry. 134 The Court thus issued its opinion on a
very similar yet differently positioned policy, finding that the worldwide
process provided “persuasive evidence that the entry suspension has a legitimate grounding in national security concerns” and that the plaintiffs
therefore would not likely succeed on the merits.135
Judicial review thus acts as a legitimating force, even where it acts to
restrain the President in relatively minimal ways. The constitutional validation is so much more pronounced when the Court upholds the Executive’s
action. As Alexander Bickel explained, “[t]he Court’s prestige, the spell it
casts as a symbol, enable it to entrench and solidify measures that may have
been tentative in the conception or that are on the verge of abandonment
in the execution.”136
The Court’s treatment of the Muslim ban’s waiver provisions illustrates
the perils of judicial vindication. The majority viewed favorably the Proclamation’s waiver program as a means to enable humanitarian exceptions
and support legitimate security interests, seemingly granting a good-faith
presumption to the President. 137 Yet, as Justice Breyer warned, and the majority dismissed as “but a piece of the picture,” 138 the minimal waiver
grants—e.g., the State Department reported approving two waivers out of
6555 eligible applicants in the Proclamation’s first month 139—called into
See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 542, 2017 WL 5987406 (2017); Trump v. Int’l Refugee
Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 542, 2017 WL 5987435 (2017).
132

See Trump v. Hawaii (The Muslim Ban Case), 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2403–06 (2018) (discussing
the rationale and purposes of Proclamation No. 9645).
133

134

Proclamation No. 9645, § 1(c).

135

The Muslim Ban Case,138 S. Ct. at 2421.

ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
BAR OF POLITICS 129 (1962). See also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246
(1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[O]nce a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show
that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the
Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated the principle of
racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting American citizens.”).
136

THE

137

See The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2422–23 (discussing Proclamation No. 9645, § 3).

138

Id. at 2423 n.7 (citation omitted).

139

Id. at 2431 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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question whether the government was applying the waiver program and
“excluding Muslims who satisfy the Proclamation’s own terms?”140 Recent
data indicate that the government denies ninety-eight percent of waiver applications. 141 The waiver program has demonstrably “not mitigated the
ban’s effects on thousands of families in dire circumstances.” 142 Yet the
opinion entrenches these possibly tentative measures as lawful and legitimate.
The hierarchical place that the Supreme Court holds in the legal system—and possibly society 143—enables it to issue the “final” pronouncement on a contested matter, adding to the opinion’s legitimacy, if not infallibility. 144 Its assertion of jurisdiction therefore offers the potential to check
other branches but also to dominate interpretation of contested rights.
What advocates must therefore ask is whether Supreme Court review so
predictably results in validating presidential power and eroding marginalized groups’ rights such that they should forsake litigation, instead focusing
on other means of, and forums for, advocacy that can protect these groups
and reconstitute a definition of the state and peoples’ rights. As I explain in
the next part, this question has arisen before.
III. THE GENERAL CASE AGAINST LITIGATION
Both prior and subsequent to the advent of the national surveillance
state, scholars and civil-rights advocates warned against litigation as a
means of blunting executive powers that impair minority groups’ rights.
Taking a normative approach, Jeremy Waldron questions locating disputes
over rights within the Judicial branch. 145 He contends that such reliance
“distracts [society] with side-issues about precedent, texts, and interpretation” and “is politically illegitimate . . . privileging majority voting among a

Id. at 2430 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The majority discounted Justice Breyer’s arguments as
based on “selective statistics, anecdotal evidence, and a declaration from unrelated litigation” and inappropriate under rational basis review. Id. at 2423 n.7.
140

Betsy Fisher & Samantha Power, Opinion, The Trump Administration Is Making a Mockery of
the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/0
1/27/opinion/trump-travel-ban-waiver.html.
141

142

Id.

See Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2240,
2251 (2019) (noting that although “the Court’s public approval rating has dropped, the
overall level of confidence in the Court has nonetheless remained reasonably high, particularly as compared to Congress and the President”).
143

144 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“We are not final
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”).
145

See Waldron, Judicial Review, supra note 2, at 1351.
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small number of unelected and unaccountable judges.” 146 Moreover, the
notion of courts as guardians of minority rights may rest on a faulty premise concerning judicial elites’ sympathies and beliefs. 147 Waldron refutes
that assumption, concluding that “[a] practice of judicial review cannot do
anything for the rights of the minority if there is no support at all in the society for minority rights.” 148
Predating the 9/11 attacks, Mark Tushnet questioned liberals’ historical
reliance on judicial review over political advocacy to protect individual
rights.149 Tushnet faults a myopic litigation approach for both its hubris
and underestimating of harm. First, “[l]awyers are likely to overestimate the
contributions we can make to social progress, for obvious and understandable reasons. Cautions about what we can actually accomplish help deflate
our sense that we are essential contributors to social change.” 150 Second,
“[w]hen people lose in the Supreme Court, they really lose, because the rest
of the society may come to think not merely that their claims lacked constitutional force, but that their claims had no moral justification whatever.” 151
Tushnet’s observations enjoy equal, if not greater, force in the national security and immigration contexts.
Joseph Margulies and Hope Metcalf maintain that the post-9/11 civil
rights “interventionist” litigation strategy and narrative suffers from amnesia. 152 In celebrating the judiciary in the face of a “legally deviant” executive, the legal argument minimizes the long American history of suppressing marginalized groups in the name of security. 153 Even apparent legal

146

Id. at 1353.

147

Id. at 1405.

148

Id. at 1404.

See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 129 (1999).
See also id. at 65 (“It would be a mistake to think that the public’s [constitutional rights] definitions have to be the same as the ones the Court offers . . . .”).
149

150 Id. at 141. See also Stephen Wizner & Jane Aiken, Teaching and Doing: The Role of Law School
Clinics in Enhancing Access to Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 997, 1008 n.41 (2004) (warning that
“lawyer-driven” and “organization-driven” impact and reform-minded litigation, as opposed
to “client-driven” efforts, may be perceived as using the law “to empower lawyers to determine in the abstract what is in the public interest” rather than “to struggle for social justice
for the poor”).
151

TUSHNET, supra note 149, at 138.

152

Margulies & Metcalf, supra note 111, at 444.

Id. at 444–45. See id. at 470–71 (arguing that the interventionist position “failed because it
was premised upon a legalistic view of rights that simply cannot be squared with the reality
of the American political experience”).
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victories may alarm certain quarters and generate backlash. 154 Richard Fallon similarly suggests that the Court’s “War on Terror” decisions are “politically constructed,” insofar as the Justices decide issues based on anticipated popular reception and respect of political branches.155
Noting the “contingent character of rights in American society,” 156
Margulies and Metcalf explain that a rights-based litigation approach is not
likely to prove successful “for marginalized people with little political capital. To be effective, therefore, we must look beyond the courts and grapple
with the hard work of long-term change with, through and, perhaps, in
spite of law.” 157
Contemplating rejecting litigation as a tool of advocacy in the face of
judicial resistance to minority rights arguments and undue deference to
state security claims is not unique to the United States. In Israel and the
Occupied Palestinian Territories, civil-rights groups and individual lawyers
variously considered abandoning—or did abandon—litigation as a tool, for
fear that their efforts had the opposite of their intended effect—
legitimating, rather than eliminating—the Israeli occupation. 158 David
Kretzmer observed that Israeli High Court opinions often sent the message
that the military’s action had been vetted and were found, by an independent body, to comply with the rule of law.159 Such rulings had the effect of
softening the Israeli position in the eyes of the world, as well as bestowing
legitimacy on the actions to the Israeli public and military. 160 The Court’s

154

See id. at 462–63, 471.

Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror: An Essay on
Law and Political Science, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 352, 363 (2010).
155

Margulies & Metcalf, supra note 111, at 440. See also STUART SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS
RIGHTS 5 (2d ed. 2004). Scheingold criticizes a “myth of rights” as “premised on a direct
linking of litigation, rights, and remedies with social change.” Id. He doubts that courts will
often fashion apposite rights with attendant remedies that produce desired social transformation. Id.
156

OF

157 Margulies & Metcalf, supra note 111, at 440 (citing Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom:
Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 393–94 (1987)).
158 See MICHAEL SFARD, THE WALL AND THE GATE: ISRAEL,
BATTLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 21–24, 30–36 (2018).

PALESTINE,

AND THE

LEGAL

159 DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL AND
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 2–3, 197 (2002).

See KRETZMER, supra note 159, at 2–3; SFARD, supra note 158, at 21–24, 30–36; JOHN
REYNOLDS, LEGITIMISING THE ILLEGITIMATE? THE ISRAELI HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE AND
THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY 45 (AL-HAQ, 2010) (asking “whether continued
involvement with the [High Court of Justice] simply assists in strengthening the occupation,
and on a broad community level, works against the human rights causes being fought for”);
Ronen Shamir, “Landmark Cases” and the Reproduction of Legitimacy: The Case of Israel’s High
160
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review may have ameliorated the policy’s harshest effects, but it also bestowed legal legitimacy on the occupation, thus solidifying it. 161
But the litigation critics are not absolutists. Waldron acknowledges that
litigation may serve as a necessary tool to confront racial or religious pathologies.162 Further, Tushnet’s critique serves to elevate methodological
consciousness rather than eliminate litigation as a tool. 163 Margulies and
Metcalf also do not entirely renounce litigation so much as they call for a
broader and more effective approach.164 (Margulies in particular has been
at the forefront of post-9/11 litigation advocacy). Finally, in the almost two
decades since Kretzmer voiced his critique, lawyers continue to challenge
the Israeli occupation in court, albeit mindful of litigation’s limitations and
potentially corroding and legitimating effects. 165 The following section accordingly addresses the arguments in favor of litigation with an eye toward
fashioning a hybrid approach to challenging executive power and the related discounting of marginalized group rights.
IV.THE CASE FOR LITIGATION
The argument in favor of litigation is straightforward. A civil-rights
lawyer’s obligation is to aid her client, protect the client from illegitimate
constitutional and statutory violations, and uphold the Constitution itself,
which may include arguing in favor of institutional alignments in the form
of constitutional separation of powers. Particularly when her client faces
deportation, removal, detention, or other infringements of personal liberty,
a lawyer’s duty to her client supersedes policy concerns the about judicial
vindication. 166 Given the client’s vulnerable posture, a lawyer would not be
doing her job were she not to seriously consider pursing injunctive relief,
seeking to stay or enjoin executive actions that may disrupt family units,
send people back to dangerous environments, or detain them. To swear off
Court of Justice, 24 L. LAW & SOC’Y REV. 781, 783 (1990) (contending that Israeli High Court
of Justice’s rulings “legitimized Israeli rule over the territories”).
161

See KRETZMER, supra note 159, at 197–98; Shamir, supra note 160, at 783.

162

See Waldron, Judicial Review, supra note 2, at 1352.

163

See TUSHNET, supra note 149, at 137–41.

164

See Margulies & Metcalf, supra note 111, at 463–64.

See SFARD, supra note 158, at 450 (characterizing “litigation as the most effective tool in
the fight for human rights in the context of the occupation”); id. at 452 (concluding “that
the active cost of High Court losses and participation in its proceedings has diminished over
the years”).
165

As Israeli human rights lawyer Michael Sfard observes, “A human rights worldview does
not condone sacrificing the individual for the greater good (especially when this good is
speculative and indirect).” Id. at 451. My mentor and great civil-rights lawyer Larry Lustberg
would often say: “If you are winning all your cases, you aren’t taking the right cases.”
166
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litigation or particular forms of litigation might well constitute legal malpractice and/or moral bankruptcy. 167
Many civil-rights advocates will face situations that require them to
pursue a litigation route that will possibly benefit their individual client
while producing “bad law” that may adversely affect others. In Ashcroft v. alKidd, counsel for Abdullah al-Kidd filed a civil lawsuit challenging his sixteen-day detention, alleging that the attorney general had authorized a policy of improperly holding terrorism suspects under the material-witness
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144, when it lacked sufficient evidence to otherwise
charge them. 168 The Court held that such detention based on a valid warrant, regardless of improper motive, did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 169 The Court could have avoided making this ruling under the qualified-immunity doctrine and simply held that the law was not clearly
established at the time, thereby affording Attorney General Ashcroft immunity. 170 However, the Court reasoned that correcting the lower court’s
holding “ensures that courts do not insulate constitutional decisions at the
frontiers of the law from our review or inadvertently undermine the values
qualified immunity seeks to promote.”171 Though the Court arguably expanded the legal justifications for detention under the Fourth Amendment,
Mr. al-Kidd ultimately received compensation from the government—an
impossible outcome without litigation.172
Litigation also may be the least-worst option given the political
branches’ disinclination to restrain the Executive. 173 Litigation does enjoy
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT. r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“A lawyer
should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to
vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor.”); SFARD, supra note 158, at 451.
167

168

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 734 (2011).

Id. at 740 (“Because al-Kidd concedes that individualized suspicion supported the issuance of the material-witness arrest warrant; and does not assert that his arrest would have
been unconstitutional absent the alleged pretextual use of the warrant; we find no Fourth
Amendment violation.”). Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the majority’s characterization. Id.
at 748 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“Nowhere in al-Kidd’s complaint is there any concession that the warrant gained by the FBI agents was validly obtained.”).
169

See id. at 747–49 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (questioning the need to address the constitutional claims). See also id. at 751–53 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (questioning the need to address the constitutional claims).
170

171

Id. at 735.

See Richard A. Serrano, Muslim American Caught up in Post-9/11 Sweep Gets an Apology, L.A.
TIMES (Feb. 14, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-detainee-apology-20150214story.html [https://perma.cc/E82Y-6E9F].
172

173

See infra Part III.A.
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its successes, particularly within the lower courts.174 And its critics may exaggerate litigation’s failures, the legitimacy adverse opinions enjoy, and the
contagion effects of unfavorable opinions. 175
A. The Only-Branch Option
However unsuccessful one views the litigation endeavor in the national
security sphere, there appear to be few other options in the face of an
even-more-deferential legislative branch. Advocacy routes that appeal to
the majoritarian, representative branch are likely to meet even less success
than those initiated in the courts for at least four reasons. First, Congress
has seemingly accepted that the Executive retains the most expertise in the
national security sphere and is the most functionally equipped to act. Indeed, Congress has also acceded to the view that congressional limitations
may encumber the President when it needs the utmost discretion to make
swift decisions and act decisively, as evidenced by the scant declarations of
war and Congress’s resistance to crafting a new authorization for use of
military force subsequent to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 176
Second, and closely related, Congress has endowed the President with
significant authorities—including ceding emergency powers and delegating
enforcement and implementation authority—and greater latitude to pursue
national security and intelligence priorities.177 That delegation is in full view
174

See infra Part III.B.

175

See infra Part III.C, E.

See BARBARA SALAZAR TORREON & SOFIA PLAGAKIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
INSTANCES OF USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1798-2018 (July 17, 2019),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5QV-4Y9]) (noting that
there have been eleven war declarations relating to five distinct wars: War of 1812, MexicanAmerican War, Spanish-American War, World War I, and World War II); Fred Kaplan, Congress Needs to Take Responsibility for America’s Wars, SLATE (May 23, 2019), https://slat
e.com/news-and-politics/2019/05/aumf-congress-syria-barbara-lee.html [https://perma.c
c/6MNP-AKMM] (observing that “Congress has relapsed into passivity, letting ‘the imperial presidency’ resume,” by failing to amend or repeal the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, on which three presidents have relied for nearly eighteen years to justify military
operations in twelve countries).
176

Raising concerns over national security and unlawful migration, President Trump recently invoked congressional grants of emergency authority under sections 201 and 301 of the
National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-51 (in addition to asserting executive authority under Article II) to declare a national emergency at the southern border and direct military forces to assist the Department of Homeland Security and utilize construction authority
under 10 U.S.C. § 2808. Proclamation No. 9844, 84 Fed. Reg. 4949 (Feb. 15, 2019). Though
Congress terminated the emergency declaration by joint resolution, President Trump vetoed
that unusual legislative defiance. Jacobs, supra note 13. Civil-rights advocates and plaintiffs
(including sixteen states) have challenged the President’s efforts to re-appropriate funding to
the wall that Congress authorized for other military purposes. See e.g., Complaint at 4, Sierra
Club v. Trump, No. 19-CV-00892-HSG, 2019 WL 2715422 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 2019). See
also Priscilla Alvarez & Joyce Tseng, Tracking the Legal Challenges to Trump’s Emergency Declara177
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in the immigration context where The Muslim Ban Case plaintiffs unsuccessfully challenged the Proclamation as exceeding the authority Congress delegated to the President. 178
Third, Congress responds to popular pressures to ensure security.179 As
a result, most anti-terrorism or national security legislation will meet the
perceived needs of the majority but may disregard minority groups’ inter-

tion, CNN POLITICS (June 5, 2019), https://edition.cnn.com/2019/02/20/politics/nationalemergency-declaration-lawsuit-tracker/index.html [https://perma.cc/57T2-TYUZ] (describing and providing links to six pending lawsuits regarding the President’s national emergency declaration). In a trajectory similar to The Muslim Ban Case, lower courts enjoined the
President’s redirection of military funding only to have the Supreme Court stay the injunction. Sierra Club, 2019 WL 2715422, at *1, denying stay, 929 F.3d 670 (9th Cir. 2019), granting
stay, Trump v. Sierra Club, No. 19A60, 2019 WL 3369425 (Mem.) (July 26, 2019). President
Trump predicted that very course of events:
[T]hey will sue us in the Ninth Circuit, even though it shouldn’t be
there . . . . And we’ll possibly get a bad ruling and then we’ll get another
bad ruling and then we’ll end up the Supreme Court, and then hopefully we’ll get a fair shake and we’ll win in the Supreme Court, just like the
ban.
Mark Moore, Trump Bashes Lawsuit from ‘Radical Left’ States Over National Emergency Declaration,
N.Y. POST (Feb. 19, 2019, 8:55 AM), https://nypost.com/2019/02/19/trump-basheslawsuit-from-radical-left-states-over-national-emergency-declaration/
[https://perma.cc
/9JEU-A3F2] (quoting President Trump). See also Aziz Huq, Has the Supreme Court Already
Decided the Wall Case?, POLITICO MAG. (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.politico
.com/magazine/story/2019/02/19/trump-national-emergency-border-wall-225164
[http
s://perma.cc/795P-8R4L] (noting parallels with The Muslim Ban Case and the latter’s “predictive quality”). Congress has provided the President with scores of other laws to invoke in
asserting emergency powers that may result in similar judicial approval of executive action.
See Elizabeth L. Goitein, Trump’s Hidden Powers, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Dec. 5, 2018),
https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/trump-hidden-powers
[https://perma.cc/8E6NA3RY] (locating 136 existing statutory authorities for president to declare national emergency and noting that Congress has not rescinded such powers over past forty years); Elizabeth
Goitein, The Alarming Scope of the President’s Emergency Powers, ATLANTIC (Jan./Feb. 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/01/presidential-emergencypowers/576418/ [https://perma.cc/J9XE-7GQ4]. See generally BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., A
GUIDE
TO
EMERGENCY
POWERS
AND
THEIR
USE
(2019),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legislation/Emergency%20Powers_Pri
ntv2.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8AL-RLYL] (listing legal frameworks, statutory authorities,
and conditions for the president to declare emergencies).
178 See Trump v. Hawaii (The Muslim Ban Case), 138 S. Ct 2392, 2410–11 (2018) (rejecting
arguments that the Muslim ban “countermand[s] Congress’ considered policy judgments”
concerning alien entry given legislated vetting systems and Visa Waiver Program).

See JOHN MUELLER & MARK G. STEWART, PUBLIC OPINION AND COUNTERTERRORISM
POLICY, CATO INST. 1 (2018), https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/whitepaper-public-opinion-counterterrorism-policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/27FP-T8Q7] (“Public
opinion is the primary driver behind the extensive and excessive counterterrorism efforts
undertaken since 9/11, and officials and elites are more nearly responding to public fear
than creating it.”).
179
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ests.180 A majoritarian branch of government is not as likely to concern itself with how executive actions or statutory enactments disadvantage
smaller groups or non-constituents. 181
Fourth, the Court’s 2015 opinion in Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry
(Zivotofsky II) raises questions whether Congress may properly limit the
President’s power in the foreign relations context. 182 Though advocates and
courts may construe the opinion narrowly, 183 Zivotofsky II affords the executive branch “arguments for presidential exclusivity in a case that holds that
the President can ignore a foreign relations statute.”184
Civil-rights advocates also cannot put much stock in the Executive’s
own self-restraint. A “trust us” approach is entirely at odds with the distinct branches of government embedded in the Constitution’s first three
articles. 185 The Constitution does not abide such blind faith. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in The Muslim Ban Case, in which he calls on President
Trump to act in a measured fashion, stating “[i]t is an urgent necessity that
officials adhere to these constitutional guarantees and mandates in all their
180 Cover, Presumed Imminence, supra note 3, at 1458–59; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR:
BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 214–17 (2005).

Numerous scholars, however, contend that judges are also susceptible to prejudice and
bias when confronted with matters involving national-security policies impacting historically
marginalized groups. See Cover, Presumed Imminence, supra note 3, at 1431–42 (discussing impact of cognitive errors on judicial fact-finding in the terrorism context); Christina E. Wells,
Fear and Loathing in Constitutional Decision-Making, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 115, 119 (2005) (“[L]eft
to their own devices in times of stress, people, including judges, tend to vastly exaggerate
and react against the threats posed by disfavored groups.”); Ramzi Kassem, Implausible Realities: Iqbal’s Entrenchment of Majority Group Skepticism Towards Discrimination Claims, 114 PENN
ST. L. REV. 1443, 1454 (2010) (“[T]he subjective, common sense standard applied by the
judiciary will likely tilt towards mainstream, majority group views that include a dose of
skepticism towards claims of invidious discrimination against minority groups, particularly
unpopular, insular ones.”).
181

Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2094, 2096 (2015) (holding that
Congress has exclusive “power to recognize foreign states and governments and their territorial bounds” and that “Congress cannot command the President to contradict an earlier
recognition determination in the issuance of passports”).
182

Id. at 2088 (acknowledging that, apart from the “formal power to recognize a foreign
government . . . Congress has an important role in other aspects of foreign policy, and the
President may be bound by any number of laws Congress enacts,” although the opinion
may permit a limiting gloss).
183

Jack Goldsmith, Zivotofsky II as Precedent in the Executive Branch, 129 HARV. L. REV. 112,
114 (2015).

184

See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“The government of the United
States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men.”); Steven
Kautz, Liberty, Justice, and the Rule of Law, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 435, 444 (1999) (“Civil
government is first and fundamentally the rule of law: where men may not be judges in their
own case; where there is government of laws, not of men.”).
185
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actions, even in the sphere of foreign affairs,” but maintains that “the
statements and actions of Government officials are not subject to judicial
scrutiny or intervention,” underscores how anemic the check actually is. 186
Even a self-imposed “Executive due process,” as envisaged by the Obama
administration, for example, cannot satisfy the civil-rights advocate who
seeks to protect marginalized community members.187 Here, one would
cede to the Executive an adjudicative function, leaving it to evaluate its
own security interests—a state of affairs no less incompatible with constitutional separation of powers or the historical account of unchecked Executive treatment of minority groups. 188
B. Litigation’s Successes
The account of litigation as a host of good intentions imperiling the
Bill of Rights may be overstated. Civil-rights advocates can point to marked
successes in the lower courts. 189 Many litigation efforts appear unmitigated

See Trump v. Hawaii (The Muslim Ban Case), 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy was well aware of how little comfort the international community
might feel in light of the unfettered discretion that the Court provided President Trump. See
id. (“An anxious world must know that our Government remains committed always to the
liberties the Constitution seeks to preserve and protect, so that freedom extends outward,
and lasts.”) (emphasis added).
186

187 See Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will,
N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamasleadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html [https://perma.cc/2TZ4-DM69] (describing the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) targeted-killing memo as concluding
that the Due Process Clause “could be satisfied by internal deliberations in the executive
branch”).
188 Others forms of Executive self-checking are no more satisfactory. Though some scholars
suggest that the OLC may limit Executive power by providing “objective and accurate legal
interpretation” to the President, see Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal
Legal Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1596 (2007), others view skeptically the potential for such independent advice, considering the OLC a more political position, see Norman W. Spaulding, Professional Independence in the Office of the Attorney General, 60
STAN. L. REV. 1931, 1933–36 (2008). See also Avidan Y. Cover, Supervisory Responsibility for the
Office of Legal Counsel, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 269, 274 (2012) (describing “the aspirational
view that the job of the Attorney General is to be an independent, impartial interpreter of
the law. . . . [and] the historically based or realist view that the Attorney General and OLC
attorney can be considered a legal policy figure”). Acting Attorney General Sally Yates’s refusal to defend President Trump’s first executive order authorizing the Muslim ban was
highly unusual, both for her refusal to implement the President’s policy but also because she
was a temporary office holder—not a presidential appointee. Lizza, supra note 123. President Trump subsequently fired her. Such internal defiance is unlikely to occur with great
frequency.

See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, Trump Is Losing His War Against the Courts, SLATE (Nov. 20,
2018, 5:25 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/11/donald-trump-losingcourts-jurisprudence.html [https://perma.cc/MF3C-U8S5] (noting “the massive and consequential [lower court] rulings against this president and his administration that are logged
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victories, in which lower courts vindicated the individual’s rights or struck
down the national security or immigration policy in whole or in part. 190 In
many of these cases, the government settled or did not appeal, leaving
these victories in place. 191 A civil-rights advocate cannot ignore these realistic possibilities.
Litigation success also cannot be measured by one metric. Litigation
has various objectives apart from systematic change or injunctive relief.
Civil-rights advocates have sometimes obtained information about government practices and ensured transparency and accountability through
discovery and Freedom of Information Act lawsuits. 192 Litigation also may
draw out government positions in argument and briefing that had previously gone undisclosed. Lawsuits also may result in settlements, softening a
government policy’s impact or securing monetary compensation for an injured client. In addition, courts may issue temporary relief that may mean
all the difference for a detained client and her family.
Even when litigants ultimately lose in the Supreme Court, advocates
may secure important victories for marginalized groups’ interests through
the legal process, earning short-term reprieves, ranging from forestalling
detention to temporarily restraining a policy’s implementation to a nationevery week and rarely viewed in the aggregate,” including within the national securityimmigration contexts).
See, e.g., Hassan v. N.Y.C., 804 F.3d 277, 289–92, 301 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that Muslim
plaintiffs’ allegations that New York City Police Department engaged in intensive and widespread surveillance of them based on their religious identity satisfies the injury requirements
of standing and must overcome “heightened equal protection review”); Doe v. Mattis, 889
F.3d 745, 768 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (requiring that government provide seventy-two hours’ notice prior to transferring detainee from one country to another); Jonathan Hafetz, U.S. Citizen, Detained Without Charge by Trump Administration for a Year, is Finally Free, ACLU (Oct. 29,
2018, 11:15 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/detention/us-citizendetained-without-charge-trump-administration-year [https://perma.cc/H324-Z7AU] (reporting that due to litigation and as part of settlement agreement, the government released
American client detained for more than one year).

190

See, e.g., Hassan, 804 F.3d 277 (government did not petition for certiorari); Doe, 889 F.3d
745 (government did not petition for certiorari); Hafetz, supra note 190 (discussing settlement).
191

See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018); CIA Releases Dozens of Torture
Documents in Response to ACLU Lawsuit, ACLU (June 14, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/n
ews/cia-releases-dozens-torture-documents-response-aclu-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/9F96Q4ZE]. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) litigation in the national security context has,
however, enjoyed very limited success due in part to over-classification and the Act’s exemptions for national security. See David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of
Information Act, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1118–23 (2017). See also id. at 1120 ( “FOIA has
proven so profoundly unresponsive to the rise of national security secrecy—and therefore
to the rise of government secrecy—that we might even say there is an element of transparency
theater in the conceit that the Act secures the people’s right to know.”).
192
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wide injunction. In some instances, legal challenges and initial victories at
the lower court stages may impel the government to moderate or alter its
policies, achieving benefits for affected clients and potentially securing the
program’s constitutional footing. 193
The Muslim Ban Case and related cases fit within the account of mixed
success. Immediately following the first Executive Order’s issuance, civilrights advocates initiated legal challenges, resulting in near unanimous judicial victories for the plaintiffs. The most important net results were in enabling people to gain entry to the United States and the unification of families. The nationwide injunctions halted the order’s impact everywhere and
for significant periods of time—hardly an incremental or negligible legal
interference. Ultimately, the government altered both its legal position and
the content of the ban in responses to the successive litigation victories. 194
As a result of the legal fight against the Muslim ban, the Court’s eventual ruling addressed a policy very different from the initial order President
Trump signed almost eighteen months earlier. The legal fights thus significantly mitigated many of the ban’s most pernicious aspects, spared hundreds of individuals’ deportation and denial of entry, and reinforced the
rule of law and role of the judiciary. 195 In this respect, civil rights litigants
might view the litigation process—if not the Supreme Court’s decision and
opinion—as a success.196
Moreover, regardless of a court’s holding, constitutional litigation that
challenges policies such as the Muslim ban is “a powerful publication of
dissent,” articulating “fundamental principles of law and broader conceptions of the public good.” 197 The legal dispute and resolution of competing
193

See GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT, supra note 5, at 178, 195.

194

See supra Part I.F.

See Lind, supra note 103 (“[T]he policies in the ban have changed substantially. And it’s
hard to deny that the current version of the ban is much, much more moderate than the
first.”).
195

See id. (describing the litigation as “a victory for the ban’s opponents” because “courts
(perhaps inspired by the resistance in the streets) forced the administration to keep its ambitions within the scope of what was legally permissible, and the administration complied”).
196

Robert L. Tsai, Conceptualizing Constitutional Litigation as Anti-Government Expression: A
Speech-Centered Theory of Court Access, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 835, 871–72 (2002). Civil-rights litigants often challenge legal precedents based on a dynamic and progressive view of the law.
The posture fits well within the civil rights movement’s confrontation of legal shibboleths,
encapsulating Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s aspirational phrase that “the arc of the moral
universe is long, but it bends toward justice.” Martin Luther King, Jr., Address at the Conclusion of the Selma to Montgomery March (Mar. 25, 1965), in A CALL TO CONSCIENCE:
THE LANDMARK SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 131 (Clayborne Carson & Kris
Shepherd eds. 2001). In challenging the Muslim ban, numerous advocates and scholars contended that a more protective individual rights regime ushered in by the Warren Court could
197
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constitutional principles and underlying values “can provoke broader discourse about the moral controversies of the day.” 198 The Muslim ban litigation provides a counter-narrative to national security prerogatives, maintaining that inclusive immigration and anti-discrimination should prevail
over naked anti-Muslim prejudice and arbitrary use and abuse of power.
Failing to legally challenge national security policies may therefore undermine democratic deliberation, ceding to the government a self-serving and
highly statist constitutional interpretation.
President Trump’s overhaul of the judiciary also may not mean the
complete eradication of civil rights claims in the national security and immigration contexts. Despite The Muslim Ban Case, civil-rights litigants have
since enjoyed several victories in the lower courts concerning restrictive
immigration policies such as migrant family separation, 199 limitations on
not abide nineteenth-century conceptions of government sovereignty that would permit discrimination in determining entry of aliens. See, e.g., Brief for Immigration, Family, and Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 12–14, Hawaii v.
Trump,, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17–965), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF
/17/17-965/41696/20180330154938785_17965bsacImmigrationFamilyAndConstitutionalL
awProfessors.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZZW6-PL27] (arguing that the Supreme Court’s
changes to its domestic equal protection and fundamental rights jurisprudence favorably
impacted its review of the government’s immigration policies); Adam Cox, Why a Muslim
Ban Is Likely to be Held Unconstitutional: The Myth of Unconstrained Immigration Power, JUST
SECURITY (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/36988/muslim-ban-heldunconstitutional-myth-unconstrained-immigration-power/ [https://perma.cc/B92N-C2K
K]. See also infra Section IV.C.4 (explaining how immigration law has generally trended toward greater protections for noncitizens). Though the Court in The Muslim Ban Case evaded
fully confronting this idea of importing progressive domestic constitutional law to the national security and immigration context by characterizing the ban as “facially neutral,” the
Court relied squarely on long-held ideas of sovereignty in limiting its standard of review
over aliens’ entry to rational basis. The Muslim Ban Case, 2418–20 (2018). See also id. at 2418
(“For more than a century, this Court has recognized that the admission and exclusion of
foreign nationals is a ‘fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.’”) (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S.
787, 792 (1977)).
Tsai, supra note 197, at 879. Importantly, judges identified with both political parties echoed the sentiment of respect for the law in response to President Trump’s attacks on the
lower courts for their adverse rulings. See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1185
(9th Cir. 2017) (Bybee, J., dissenting) (“The personal attacks on the distinguished district
judge and our colleagues were out of all bounds of civic and persuasive discourse—
particularly when they came from the parties. It does no credit to the arguments of the parties to impugn the motives or the competence of the members of this court; ad hominem
attacks are not a substitute for effective advocacy. Such personal attacks treat the court as
though it were merely a political forum in which bargaining, compromise, and even intimidation are acceptable principles. The courts of law must be more than that, or we are not
governed by law at all.”).
198

Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1141 (S.D. Cal.
2018) (enjoining Department of Homeland Security from separating migrants and asylum
199
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judicial review of adverse asylum decisions, 200 and limitations on locations
where people may seek asylum. 201 Even if these cases prove ultimately less
successful in the Supreme Court, the short-term victories may justify the
litigation.
C. Pyrrhic Losses
The Muslim Ban Case’s legitimacy and adverse precedential effects may
also be overstated. Future courts, commentators, society, and history may
ultimately regard the opinion as distasteful and wrongly decided. Indeed,
many scholars and jurists considered Korematsu—which The Muslim Ban Case
smugly overruled—mistaken and one of several stains on the Supreme
Court’s history. 202 Despite Justice Jackson’s admonition that the Court’s
validation of “racial discrimination” and “transplanting American citizens .
. . . lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that
can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need,” 203 Korematsu has
been more an epithet, part of an anticanon that even the most ardent advocates of presidential power omitted as legal support. 204 The Muslim Ban Case
may enjoy a similar legacy. But the line between canonical and anticanonical may be blurry, and a consensus may not emerge for decades. In the inseekers from their minor children and ordering reunification), modified, 330 F.R.D 284 (S.D.
Cal. 2019).
200 Compare Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097, 1119 (9th Cir.
2019) (holding statutory restriction on habeas review of negative asylum determination for
arriving alien violates Suspension Clause), cert. granted, 2019 WL 5281289 (Aug. 5, 2019) (No.
19-161), with Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 450 (3d Cir. 2016) (addressing similar circumstances and holding that arriving aliens did not enjoy constitutional
rights and could not therefore seek protection under the Suspension Clause), cert. denied, 137
S. Ct. 1581 (2017).

E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (enjoining the President, DHS, and DOJ from implementing rules that would deny asylum to
anyone who does not enter a specific port of entry), stay denied, Trump v. E. Bay Sanctuary
Covenant, 139 S. Ct. 782 (2018). The Supreme Court granted a later request for a stay of a
district court’s order enjoining the government’s rule barring people from seeking asylum at
the southern border unless they were first denied asylum in a third country. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 385 F. Supp. 3d 922 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (Mem.), stay granted, Barr v. E.
Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 2019 WL 4292781 (Sept. 11, 2019) (Mem.). The asylum-bar litigation’s pattern echoes that of The Muslim Ban Case and the wall litigation, supra footnote 177
and accompanying text.
201

202 See Jamal S. Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 398–402, 422–27, 456–60
(2011).

Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting), abrogated by
Trump v. Hawaii (The Muslim Ban Case), 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
203

204 See Greene, supra note 202, at 400 (observing “that at no time since September 11 has any
U.S. government lawyer publicly used the Korematsu decision as precedent in defending executive detention decisions”).
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terim, The Muslim Ban Case Court may realize Justice Jackson’s worry, in
which the Muslim ban “becomes the doctrine of the Constitution” with “a
generative power of its own.” 205
Critics also contest that the Court’s pronouncements on executive actions validate the Establishment Clause or Equal Protection violations or
achieve a security-rights equilibrium. Baher Azmy questions first the
methodological and empirical bases of Jack Goldsmith’s “legal legitimacy.” 206 Azmy challenges the purported improvements or limitations on executive power, decrying the lack of accountability and transparency in the
current system.207 But it remains the case that it was likely the very improvements to the first and second versions of the Muslim ban that civilrights advocates forced the President to make, which “normalized” the
ban, possibly enabling a Chief Justice Roberts or Justice Kennedy to uphold the ban. 208
Azmy also disputes the normative claims to legitimacy, which, Goldsmith argues, the current national security framework enjoys. Azmy does
not perceive the Court as some Delphic Oracle, nor, he suggests, does the
public. 209 More specifically, he questions whether “judicial intervention
provides a legitimating role in light of the public disapproval of judicial decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education (in the South), Roe v. Wade, or Kelo
v. New London.” 210 Moreover, Azmy condemns the “is-ought conflation”
that Goldsmith’s analysis employs.211 Judicial review, as currently applied—
and as Korematsu’s anticanonical legacy demonstrates—may not be legitimate; it is “insufficiently robust” and too deferential. 212

205

Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

Baher Azmy, An Insufficiently Accountable Presidency: Some Reflections on Jack Goldsmith’s Power and Constraint, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 23, 27 (2012).
206

207

Id. at 31–43.

See Lind, supra note 103 (“The travel ban has been assimilated into normal political discourse and policymaking. It has become normalized, for better or worse.”).
208

209

Azmy, supra note 206, at 48.

210

Id.

Id. See also Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 53 n.146
(1983) [hereinafter Cover, Nomos and Narrative] (citing Abraham Lincoln, Lincoln-Douglas
Debates (July 10, 1858), in 2 A. LINCOLN, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN
484, 495 (R. Basler ed. 1953)) (discussing Abraham Lincoln’s view on the interpretive authority of Dred Scott (Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857)) (“[T]he only deference due the
Court’s authority is to refrain from direct resistance to its specific edicts. We are under no
obligation . . . to relate our understanding of the law, and our projection of that understanding, to the Court’s interpretation.”).
211

212

Azmy, supra note 206, at 48.
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Azmy’s critique raises important question as to legitimacy: legitimate
according to whom? 213 As he observes, Goldsmith—and the observation
applies equally to Jackson, Black, and Bickel—addresses only “legitimacy
within the U.S. constitutional system.” 214 Azmy argues that this narrow view
of legitimacy ignores the vital perspectives of victims, history, and the international community. 215 Azmy’s insistence on forming legal meaning and
legitimacy based on multiple perspectives is well taken. But in going to the
Court, advocates necessarily succumb to the United States Supreme Court’s
rhetoric and authority, for better or worse. 216 The consequences for victims

Tara Leigh Grove explains that the Court’s legitimacy (and hence their opinions) is variable, noting that several scholars “argue that members of the public tend to support the
Court if it rules ‘their way’ in salient cases.” Grove, supra note 143, at 2252. See also id. at
2253 (concluding from scholarship that “if the Supreme Court repeatedly issues ‘conservative’ (or ‘progressive’) decisions in high-profile cases, its institutional reputation will eventually decline with the ‘loser’ group”).
213

214

Azmy, supra note 206, at 60.

See id. at 60–62. The international community is unlikely to view the opinion as legitimate. For a couple decades, foreign courts have looked less and less to the United States
Supreme Court for guidance. See also David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of
the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 766–68, 779–85 (2012) (noting decline in
foreign courts’ citation to U.S. Supreme Court opinions, and attributing the disfavor to, in
part, the country’s unique Constitution, including its brevity and lack of amendments); Adam Liptak, U.S. Court is Now Guiding Fewer Nations, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/18/us/18legal.html [https://perma.cc/2EXD-SK92]
(documenting decline in international community’s citation to the U.S. Supreme Court and
possible explanations to include the Court’s conservative bent, the Court’s general resistance
to citing foreign law, access to other national courts’ opinions, and the United States’ unfavorable international reputation).
215

In the course of the Muslim ban litigation, civil rights advocates selectively drew from
the courts’ holdings as sources of moral validity or invalidity. Compare Press Release, ACLU,
ACLU Comment on Trump Appeal of Muslim Ban Ruling (Mar. 17, 2017),
https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclu-comment-trump-appeal-muslim-ban-ruling [https
://perma.cc/WK2F-3QXG] (noting Omar Jadwat’s, director of the ACLU’s Immigrants’
Rights Project and counsel for several Muslim ban plaintiffs, comments on the government’s appeal of a district court’s order enjoining the ban) (“President Trump’s Muslim ban
has fared miserably in the courts, and for good reason—it violates fundamental provisions
of our Constitution. We look forward to defending this careful and well-reasoned decision
in the appeals court.”) with Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Comment on Supreme Court Muslim Ban Ruling (June 26, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclu-commentsupreme-court-muslim-ban-ruling (noting Jadwat’s comments after defeat in Supreme
Court) (“This ruling will go down in history as one of the Supreme Court’s great failures . . .
The court failed today, and so the public is needed more than ever. We must make it crystal
clear to our elected representatives: If you are not taking actions to rescind and dismantle
Trump’s Muslim ban, you are not upholding this country’s most basic principles of freedom
and equality.”). Jadwat’s comments also reflect the litigant’s dynamic perceptions of the
courts’ institutional legitimacy and at least one post-litigation advocacy route and alternative
source for legal meaning. And they align with Robert Cover’s skepticism that the Court’s
interpretive authority should follow from its hierarchical position. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 211, at 43 (“The position that only the state creates law thus confuses the sta216
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are inevitably severe, history’s verdict still waits, and the world’s opinion is
of questionable relevance within the United States. 217
D. Opposition to Other Civil-Rights Litigation
Critics have long questioned civil-rights litigants’ focus on advocacy
through the courts. 218 Numerous women’s rights and same-sex marriage
advocates, for example, criticized litigation strategies and championed legislative approaches. 219 These critics often eschewed litigation out of fear of
an inhospitable Court (and thus unfavorable outcomes on the merits) and a
belief that their causes would be better served by approval through a democratic, rather than anti-majoritarian, path. 220 Arguably, the success at the
Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade 221 and Obergefell v. Hodges 222 vindicate the litigation route. But some critics maintain that the larger social change sought
by advocates in these areas would have been better served and secured
through popular referendum and democratic process rather than through
the courts. 223
For immigrants and other groups generally affected by national securities policies, however, the majoritarian process may be even less hospitable
than the courts. Whereas some abortion and gay-rights advocates marshaled credible arguments that legislative advocacy, statewide appeals, and
popular measures could achieve aims similar to those via lawsuit, these avenues may not prove as fruitful for immigrants and other groups targeted
by national security policies. National security and immigration litigation
tus of interpretation with the status of political domination. It encourages us to think that
the interpretive act of the court is privileged in the measure of its political ascendance.”).
Justice Kennedy anticipated an international backlash to the opinion and its vindication
of the Muslim ban when he invoked “[a]n anxious world” in pleading to the President “to
adhere to the Constitution and to its meaning and its promise.” The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S.
Ct. 2392, 2424 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
217

218

See supra Part II.

See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v.
Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 381 (1985) (“Roe ventured too far in the change it ordered. The
sweep and detail of the opinion stimulated the mobilization of a right-to-life movement and
an attendant reaction in Congress . . . .”); Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and
Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 475 (2005) (cautioning that cases such as Brown v. Board
of Education and Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, which “judicially mandate[] social
reform[,] may mobilize greater resistance than change accomplished through legislatures or
with the acquiescence of other democratically operated institutions.”).
219

220

Ginsburg, supra note 219, at 385; Klarman, supra note 219, at 475.

221

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

222

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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Ginsburg, supra note 219, at 382.
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differ in at least three ways. First, state and local ballot or popular initiatives
provide a less plausible forum for advocacy because most national security
measures fall within the federal government’s exclusive authority. Second,
executive dominance over national security measures and legislative capitulation (even in areas such as immigration) may render appeals to legislatures
less effective or useful. Third, the often reactive and clandestine nature of
national security measures challenge popular efforts to embrace alternative
policies. Finally, the rooted fear of minority groups attached to so many national security measures may prove to be a psychological obstacle to mobilizing an opposition. In this context litigation may be the best refuge.
E. Overstating Spillover Risks
Concerns that national-security-related decisions will weaken domestic
law and civil-liberties protections may be overblown. Advocates and judges
are capable of distinguishing cases pertaining to immigration and national
security from cases that feature domestic matters. Indeed, even judges who
sympathize with executive prerogatives in the security and immigration
context may exhibit greater skepticism when the issues address citizens or
fall more clearly within a domestic law enforcement context. 224 But fears
over The Muslim Ban Case’s transsubstantive impacts are not unwarranted. 225
The Muslim Ban Case reads as a vindication of the policy’s bigoted motivations, stating unequivocally that the nature of untrammeled executive
power in the national security and immigration arena affords the President’s pretexts great latitude. It is again a victory of process over substance.
Viewed in this light, the opinion, and the history of the litigation, may be
read as a form of theater. The rule of law becomes a rhetorical device, in
which the Court and courts have cajoled out of the presidency a limiting
principle that amounts to: don’t be sloppy; don’t be too obvious. The executive will receive a presumption of regularity for any of its policies—no
matter the evidence of religious bigotry—provided the process appears legitimate on its face. But advocates have other strategies and resources to
leverage in supporting non-citizens and other marginalized groups.
V. QUIETING THE COURT
Advocates seeking systemic changes to particular social justice issues
must assess which approaches will prove most effective at social transformation. Tushnet suggests that if activists have “a choice between investing
[their] resources in a legal strategy and investing in some other strategy,
See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (upholding citizen-detainee’s due
process rights related to the battlefield). See also supra Part I.E (discussing post-Muslim ban
lower court opinions).
224

225

See supra Part I.E.
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such as community mobilization through its churches . . . it may make
sense to avoid investing in a legal strategy even though the strategy would
result in victories in court.” 226 At base, such strategizing around the risks
attendant to litigation informs advocates’ cost-benefit analysis. As a matter
of resource allocation, Tushnet contends that “the cautions serve to improve the accuracy of the calculation of the possible benefit of investing in
legal action rather than in something else—street demonstrations, public
opinion campaigns, or whatever.” 227 Considering these cautions and engaging in such calculations could prove vital to the success of advocacy in the
national security context.
Adopting Tushnet’s “cost-benefit” approach, advocates (legal and otherwise) confronting the national security apparatus on behalf of marginalized groups (often non-citizens of color) must consider all advocacy strategies. 228 Litigation cannot come off the table. There are, in particular, too
many individuals targeted by the state whose liberty is jeopardized, and,
who without immediate appeal to the courts, will suffer substantial and often irrevocable harms. Despite their critique of post-9/11 civil rights ligation, Margulies and Metcalf maintain that “lawyering (and even litigation)
can make real differences in the lives of marginalized people.” 229 In these
instances, however, litigation should not be the only route.
Multiple and varied forms of extralegal advocacy aimed at transformational change may support and inform direct representation and individualized litigation. These efforts should buttress or even alter the rights framework that underlies any judicial challenge. 230 Advocates also should
consider strategies that, given the Court’s likely resistance to overhauling a
policy and the potential legitimizing of the policy, do not entail direct attacks.
Margulies and Metcalf argue that lawyers and academics must reconceive the oft-litigated disputes over rights and ideal models of the state “as
a battle over political resources and how they have been, and continue to
be, mobilized to create narratives about national identity—an identity that
is alternately threatened or calmed depending on the symbolic manipula226

TUSHNET, supra note 149, at 137 n.22 (accompanying text at 216).

Id. at 141 n.27 (accompanying text at 216) (noting that cautions refers to “[c]autions
about what we can actually accomplish help deflate our sense that we are essential contributors to social change”).
227

228

See id. at 137 n.22 (accompanying text at 216).

229

Margulies & Metcalf, supra note 111, at 471.

230 See id. (“As a beginning, scholarship should be more attuned to the limitations of the judiciary, and mindful of the complicated tendency of narratives to generate backlash and
counter-narratives.”).
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tion of unfolding events.” 231 Advocates should therefore, when possible,
exercise non-litigation strategies to establish narrative alternatives to the
brittle individual rights framework that reflexively supports federal government policies restraining immigrant interests. Efforts should be undertaken at all levels—media, public advocacy, electoral, and academic—to
transform conceptions of identity and the relationships the American social
contract undergirds.
This section first addresses some discreet avenues within litigation that
may avoid the Supreme Court’s validating reach. The section then proposes
a new understanding of immigrant relationships to the state that may prove
more resistant to xenophobic assertions of American identity rooted in the
state institution as purveyor of security, and appeal to conservative segments of society that prize non-governmental institutions of family and religion. A framework that affirms our common humanity should prove less
susceptible to nationalistic impulses and less subservient to powers deriving
from national sovereignty.
A. Revised Litigation Approach
Working within the litigation realm, advocates should generally seek to
maximize claims that will aid their particular client. However, they should
resist efforts to dismantle national security policies through impact litigation. 232 Courts may be more inclined to rule in favor of particular individuals and their particular case or controversy rather than a class action challenging a nationwide policy.
Litigants also should attempt to domesticate their claims as much as
possible, notwithstanding the national-security or foreign-affairs elements.233 Clients also may be better served by litigation strategies that do
231

Id. at 463.

Michael Sfard shares in his book a draft resolution that Israeli human rights attorneys
and legal organizations collectively considered, but ultimately rejected, concerning their legal
advocacy strategy in the Occupied Territories. SFARD, supra note 158, at 30–31. The draft
proposed that an organization would not engage in public interest litigation before the High
Court of Justice—aimed at altering or stopping policies and legislation—without collective
organizational approval. Id. Organizations could continue to file individual cases on behalf
of clients relating to particular legal issues. Id. at 30. The draft contemplated a collective organizational international legal strategy, from which any legal action would be subject to an
organization’s approval. Id. at 30–31. See also REYNOLDS, supra note 160, at 49 (discussing
potential “comprehensive or partial boycott against the [High Court of Justice]” but noting
the need to balance that strategy “against the losses suffered by Palestinians”). See also
Wizner & Aiken, supra note 150, at 1008 n.41 (cautioning that impact litigation risks privileging lawyer and organizational interests over those of clients).
232

See supra notes 94–105 and accompanying text (discussing courts and scholars’ distinguishing of The Muslim Ban Case based in part because it involved aliens seeking entry and
alleged national security concerns).
233
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not focus on constitutional rights, animus, or separation of powers, but rather concentrate on factual underpinnings.234 Yet even when facts are contested, the Court is still more likely to accede to the President’s version.235
But litigants should prioritize cases with “good facts,” conscious of the
aphorism that “bad facts make bad law.” 236 Lawyers advocating in the
courts should thus draft their complaints mindful of what facts may invite
or enable the courts to build on the edifice of executive power and presidential discretion in the national security and immigration context.237
The choice of constitutional claim also may make a difference in the
Court’s analysis and outcome. For example, in The Muslim Ban Case litigation, lawyers appeared to emphasize the Establishment Clause claim over
the Free Exercise Clause claim. 238 Litigants—and as a result, the courts—
may have focused on the Establishment Clause claim for at least three reasons. First, the initial executive order included a religious minority exception to its ban on refugee admission, which appeared a thinly disguised

I am indebted to Andrew Pollis for this important strategic suggestion. See also Cox et al.,
supra note 98 (explaining that The Muslim Ban Case outcome owes much to “the fact that it
was a case involving questions of motive and proof” and concerned “immigration policies
implicating national security”).

234

See Trump v. Hawaii (The Muslim Ban Case), 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2422 (2018) (“[T]he Executive’s evaluation of the underlying facts is entitled to appropriate weight, particularly in the
context of litigation involving ‘sensitive and weighty interests of national security and foreign affairs.’”) (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33–34 (2010));
Cover, Presumed Imminence, supra note 3, at 1440–50 (describing how confirmation bias, availability heuristic, and probability neglect infect judicial fact-finding in the national security
context in favoring government policies).
235

Attribution for the common saying is hard to come by. Its judicial lineage appears to derive from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ statement that “[g]reat cases, like hard cases, make
bad law.” N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
236

See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 744 (2011); supra footnotes 168-72 and accompanying text (discussing al-Kidd and the Court’s expanding bases for detention under the
material witness statute based in part on the majority’s view that the plaintiff conceded that
the warrant was validly obtained).
237

In opposing the government’s petition for certiorari, Hawaii raised the additional question, “3. Whether Proclamation No. 9645 violates the Establishment Clause.” Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit at i, Trump v. Hawaii (The Muslim Ban Case), 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17965), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-965/27771/2018011217284882
5_Trump%20v.%20Hawaii%20Brief%20in%20Opposition.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7TRELW2]. Having ruled in Hawaii’s favor on statutory grounds, the Ninth Circuit did not address its constitutional claims. Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 690-92 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining its holding that Proclamation exceeds statutory authority under § 1182(f) avoids
ruling that the statute, as the government construed its wide grant of presidential power,
amounts to an unlawful delegation). The Court directed the parties to address the Establishment Clause question as well. The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. 923, 924 (2018).
238

Quieting the Court

51

preference for Christians.239 Coupled with the restrictions on entry by aliens from seven Muslim-majority nations, the order appeared to run most
afoul of the Establishment Clause’s proscription to “make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” 240 However, the First Amendment’s religious clauses invariably “overlap,” 241 with the Establishment Clause’s
“prohibition of denominational preferences . . . inextricably connected with
the continuing vitality of the Free Exercise Clause.”242 Though litigants included within their causes of action claims that invoked Free Exercise violations, 243 complaints appeared to emphasize the Establishment Clause violation. 244
239 Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977, § 5(b) (Jan. 27, 2017), revoked by Exec. Order
No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017). Contemporaneous with the Order, President Trump suggested he wanted to prioritize the admission of Christian refugees. See President Trump Gives New Hope to Persecuted Christians, CHRISTIAN FREEDOM INT’L (Mar. 30, 2018),
https://christianfreedom.org/president-trump-gives-new-hope-to-persecuted-christians/
[https://perma.cc/NJW5-ENME] (quoting Interview by David Brody with President
Trump, CBN NEWS (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www1.cbn.com/thebrodyfile/archive/2017/01
/27/brody-file-exclusive-president-trump-says-persecuted-christians-will-be-given-priorityas-refugees [https://perma.cc/8K6P-GSE3]) (“If you were a Muslim you could come in,
but if you were a Christian, it was almost impossible and the reason that was so unfair, everybody was persecuted in all fairness, but they were chopping off the heads of everybody
but more so the Christians. And I thought it was very, very unfair.”).

U.S. CONST. amend. I. However, the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty argued in its
amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court that the parties and lower courts had wrongly addressed an Establishment Clause claim when the appropriate claim sounded under the Free
Exercise Clause. Brief for Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party at 19–20, Trump v. Hawaii (The Muslim Ban Case), 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No.
17–965), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-965/38672/2018031218465
1975_Becket%20Amicus-Trump%20v%20Hawaii%20amicus%20-%20as%20filed.pdf [http
s://perma.cc/PCR8-5K2F] (“Put simply, government disfavor toward one religion does
not—standing alone—establish another. But it does potentially violate free exercise.”).

240

241

Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962).

Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245 (1982). The Becket Fund contended that the
Court’s later cases “treat Larson as essentially Free Exercise precedent,” which “is consistent
with Larson’s application of strict scrutiny.” Brief for Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, supra note 240, at 29 n.8 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 536 (1993); Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877
(1990)).
242

See, e.g., Third Amended Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at
¶¶ 310–15, Does v. Trump, 328 F. Supp. 3d 1185 (W.D. Wash. 2018) (No. 2:17-cv-00178JLR), 2017 WL 6017688, https://www.aclu-wa.org/docs/third-amended-class-actioncomplaint-declaratory-and-injunctive-relief-doe-et-al-v-trump
[https://perma.cc/U63RRZX8] (denominating Count One as “First Amendment—Establishment, Free Exercise,
Speech and Assembly Clauses”); Proposed Third Amended Complaint, supra note 35 (asserting distinct Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause counts).
243

244 See, e.g., Third Amended Class Action Complaint, Does, 328 F. Supp. 3d (No. 2:17-cv00178-JLR), supra note 243, at ¶ 9 (“[T]he current set of orders remain in contravention of
‘[t]he clearest command of the Establishment Clause . . . that one religious denomination
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Second, litigants may have believed that Establishment Clause claims
would more likely overcome standing hurdles than Free Exercise Clause
claims. 245 Establishment Clause claims may permit an observer to challenge
the offending government policy whereas Free Exercise claims would require a showing of personal harm. 246 Moreover, the more generalized bases
for standing and structural protections afforded by the Establishment
Clause make it less susceptible to challenges relating to the personal protections the Constitution affords to aliens outside the United States. 247
cannot be officially preferred over another.”) (quoting Larson, 456 U.S. at 244)); id. at ¶ 312
(“EO-3 and the October 2017 Agency Memo violate the Establishment Clause by singling
out Muslims for disfavored treatment. They have the purpose and effect of inhibiting religion, and are neither justified by, nor closely fitted to, any compelling governmental interest.”); id. at ¶¶ 177, 188, (describing examples of President Trump’s intent to preference
Christian faith); Proposed Third Amended Complaint, supra note 35, at ¶ 108 (“[T]he orders
require the State to tolerate a policy designed to disfavor the Islamic faith, in violation of the
Establishment Clause of both the federal and state constitutions.”). ACLU Legal Director
David Cole similarly stressed the Establishment Clause violation in his early statements on
the Executive Order. David Cole, We’ll See You in Court: Why Trump’s Executive Order on Refugees Violates the Establishment Clause, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 28, 2017), https://www
.justsecurity.org/36936/well-court-trumps-executive-order-refugees-violates-establishmentclause/ [https://perma.cc/7JZ8-X8JP].
See Kristen Waggoner, Symposium: Navigating Animus and Accommodation, SCOTUSBLOG
(June 27, 2018, 11:08 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-navigatinganimus-and-accommodation/ [https://perma.cc/KA5C-6HZ5] (speculating that “Hawaii
likely wanted to take advantage of the fact that lower courts have created looser standing
requirements for establishment clause claims—sometimes finding standing based on mere
spiritual and dignitary injury”); Ira C. Lupu, et al., The Imperatives of Structure: The Travel Ban,
the Establishment Clause, and Standing to Sue, TAKE CARE (Apr. 3, 2017),
https://takecareblog.com/blog/the-imperatives-of-structure-the-travel-ban-the-establishme
nt-clause-and-standing-to-sue [https://perma.cc/TJY4-7UW9] (“Whether or not such
claims of injury [stigmatization and separation from family members] are sufficient for
standing to press other types of claims, the more capacious doctrine under the Establishment Clause should permit standing here.”).
245

See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968) (granting taxpayer standing to challenge expenditures under the Establishment Clause). See generally Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677
(2005) (addressing Establishment Clause claim brought by a person who frequently “encounters” Ten Commandment monument’s placement on the state capitol grounds). See also
Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 n.9 (1963) (“[T]he requirements for standing to challenge state action under the Establishment Clause, unlike those
relating to the Free Exercise Clause, do not include proof that particular religious freedoms
are infringed.”).
246

See Lupu, et al., supra note 245 (contending that the Establishment Clause “addresses the
character of government independent of any particular claim of rights” and thus may protect non-citizens’ “rights”). In his concurrence in The Muslim Ban Case, Justice Thomas appeared to reject any Free Exercise Clause claim concerning aliens seeking entry to the United States, perhaps validating the litigants’ prioritizing the Establishment Clause claim. See
Trump v. Hawaii (The Muslim Ban Case), 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The plaintiffs cannot raise any other First Amendment claim, since the alleged religious discrimination in this case was directed at aliens abroad.”) (emphasis added) (citing
United States v. Verdugo–Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990)).
247
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Finally, the plaintiffs may have thought they were more likely to succeed on the merits because a mere showing of an establishment of religion
would violate the Constitution, regardless of the government’s security interests. 248 In addition, the relief would be systemic overhaul rather than
piecemeal and personal to each plaintiff’s injury. 249
But the plaintiffs might have fared better had they received a more fulsome hearing on their Free Exercise Clause claims. Had they been able to
show that they suffered distinct injuries caused by the ban, such as the denigration of their faith and exercise of religion with family members, the
Court might have subjected the claims to a strict-scrutiny analysis. 250 Such a
balancing of interests might have provided the Court with a “compromise
between the per se violations characteristic of the establishment clause and
the excessive deference characteristic of rational basis.”251 To be sure, such
speculation is just that; it is impossible to know how the Supreme Court
would have ruled on a Free Exercise Clause claim.
See McCreary Cty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859 (2005)
(“[W]hether government action has ‘a secular legislative purpose’ has been a common, albeit
seldom dispositive, element of our [Establishment Clause] cases.”) (quoting Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 20 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 1265, 1277 (2017) (“Once a practice . . . is judicially determined to be an establishment of religion, the case is over. Competing government interests play no part.”);
Waggoner, supra note 245 (“Hawaii surely knew that domestic establishment clause violations are typically treated as per se improper. No strict scrutiny. No balancing of interests.
That would have provided an easy way to circumvent the national-security interests asserted
by the government.”); Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, supra note 240, at 30
(“Establishment Clause violations . . . are usually flatly forbidden without reference to the
strength of governmental purposes.”) (quoting Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d
1245, 1266 (10th Cir. 2008)).
248

Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, supra note 240, at 29 (describing scope of
Establishment Clause remedy to include invalidating Proclamation as “far broader than necessary to provide relief to the specific plaintiffs before the courts” under the Free Exercise
Clause). Compare Carl H. Esbeck, Differentiating the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, 42 J.
CHURCH & ST. 311, 311 (2000) (“Because of its structural character, the task of the Establishment Clause is to limit government from legislating or otherwise acting on any matter
‘respecting an establishment of religion.’”) (internal citation omitted), with id. at 320 (“[T]he
redressing of a personal harm to an individual’s religious belief or practice is the Free Exercise Clause’s only function.”).
249

See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993)
(“A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general application must
undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny.”); Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty,
supra note 240, at 31 (contending that “under the more appropriate Free Exercise Clause
analysis, courts should analyze whether the order is neutral and generally applicable and
then, if appropriate, apply strict scrutiny to determine its constitutionality”). Compare Larson
v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982) (applying strict scrutiny to an Establishment Clause
claim), with Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, supra note 240, at 29 n.8 (arguing the case should be treated as Free Exercise Clause precedent).

250

251

Waggoner, supra note 245.
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Litigants will generally assert any non-frivolous claims in the hopes that
something will obtain relief for their clients. The Court’s prior machinations to find in favor of the Executive—which included finding the Proclamation was neutral—suggest that the Court would have similarly manipulated the Free Exercise Clause standards. 252 Yet the potentially distinct
treatment of religious clause claims underscores the need for litigants to
strategize in selecting their initial claims, which claims to emphasize, and
which to appeal or decline to appeal.
The request for relief also may inform the judicial outcome. The nationwide injunction illustrates the dilemma a civil-rights attorney faces. 253
On behalf of a single litigant, the immigration or civil-rights lawyer need
not seek such relief. But as a matter of ceasing a draconian policy inveighing on thousands of people’s interest, it is logically and legally supportable.
Yet demanding such relief identifies well for the court many of the tensions
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this area reflects.254 A nationwide injunction dramatically expands a single district judge’s powers over the parties before her to apply to “the universe of persons who might be subject
to enforcement.” 255 It multiplies one client’s power in the national security
and immigration context and transforms a single case into a disputation on
a national policy. 256 To the Supreme Court this may appear to be judicial
hubris that it will be tempted to pull back and restrain.
Bringing only a statutory claim may also avoid the wider fallout that asserting a constitutional claim may elicit. Whereas the former implicates
only the validity of a specific and limited legislative fiat, the latter invites a
pronouncement on the constitutional system, rights, and governance. But
See The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2419 (“[T]his Court has engaged in a circumscribed
judicial inquiry when the denial of a visa allegedly burdens the constitutional rights of a U.S.
citizen.”).
252

Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari to include the question, “[w]hether the
global injunction [barring enforcement of the travel ban] is impermissibly overbroad,” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at I, Trump v. Hawaii (The Muslim Ban Case), 138 S. Ct. 2392
(2018) (No. 17-965), the Court deemed it unnecessary to decide the issue. The Muslim Ban
Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2423.
253

See The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2429 (Thomas, J., concurring) (rejecting arguments
that nationwide injunctions “ensure that individuals who did not challenge a law are treated
the same as plaintiffs who did, and . . . give the judiciary a powerful tool to check the Executive Branch” as improper policy judgments that “are [in]consistent with the historical limits
on equity and judicial power”).
254

Howard M. Wasserman, “Nationwide” Injunctions are Really “Universal” Injunctions and They
Are Never Appropriate, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335, 338 (2018).
255

Id. Class-action lawsuits may similarly raise concerns over judicial policymaking. See
MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE CLASS
ACTION LAWSUIT 41, 46, 61 (2009).
256
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more cautious litigation restricted to statutory claims may not increase
chances of success and only delay the inevitable constitutional claims. Such
constitutional avoidance may not be possible at the Supreme Court level,
nor may it always be prudent lawyering. 257 Moreover, defendants may raise
constitutional claims in defenses or in arguments, so it is not a full-proof
solution.
Litigants also should not be too proud or focused on policy transformation to reject settlements. Once under the “Court’s shadow”—the everlooming possibility of an adverse ruling, or interlocutory orders to disclose
sensitive and embarrassing information—the government may settle and
grant a requested reprieve or remedy. 258 The role of the client may mitigate
the lawyers’ fixation on policy change. But not always. Clients too may seek
such transformation and the lawyer may be beholden to the client. In using
these varied litigant strategies, lawyers should work within the larger and
extra-judicial context; supporting, but directing less, the larger project of
social transformation and inclusion.
B. Non-Judicial Approaches
Prominent civil rights organizations’ incorporation of political campaigning, public education, lobbying, and digital advocacy all reflect the logical appeal of diversified, non-litigious advocacy. 259 Yet the groups’ reten257 See Brief in Opposition, The Muslim Ban Case, supra note 238, at i (raising Establishment
Clause violation for Supreme Court review despite the Ninth Circuit’s ruling on solely statutory grounds, presumably to better insulate it from an adverse ruling).
258

KRETZMER, supra note 159, at 3.

The ACLU, for example, describes its work on immigrants’ rights as including “targeted
impact litigation, advocacy, and public outreach.” Immigrants’ Rights, subsection What’s at
Stake,
ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/issues/immigrants-rights#act
[https://perma.cc/8NQA-F7ME] (last visited Dec. 30, 2019) (providing information on
immigrants, government policies, litigation, and opportunities for people to take action). See,
e.g., Repeal Trump’s Anti-Immigrant Bans, ACLU, https://action.aclu.org/petition/repealtrumps-anti-immigrantbans?ms_aff=NAT&initms_aff=NAT&ms=190410_immigrantrights_noban&initms=1904
10_immigrantrights_noban&ms_chan=web&initms_chan=web [https://perma.cc/QRC8TX6W] (last visited Dec. 30, 2019) (“Now is the time to raise our voices and make clear that
we will not allow the Muslim, refugee, and asylum bans in our America. Add your name
demanding that Congress pass the NO BAN Act.”) (emphasis omitted). Scott Cummings
observes that many legal organizations such as the ACLU and the Center for Constitutional
Rights employ advocacy strategies and tactics that he characterizes as “movement lawyering.” Scott Cummings, Movement Lawyering, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1645, 1688 (2017). Cummings defines “movement lawyering” as “the mobilization of law through deliberately
planned and interconnected advocacy strategies, inside and outside of formal law-making
spaces, by lawyers who are accountable to politically marginalized constituencies to build the
power of those constituencies to produce and sustain democratic social change goals that
they define.” Id. at 1690 (italicization omitted).
259
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tion of litigation as a core tenet demonstrate that advocacy approaches are
flexible and diverse, not binary as Tushnet’s analysis suggests. Advocacy
groups can walk and chew gum at the same time. Given the Court’s rooted
support of the Executive and likely enduring antipathy to immigrant rights
in the national security context, groups should marshal alternative approaches (and consequently shift resources) to change both thinking and
thinkers. 260
First, the Court’s deferential national-security analysis means that who
holds the levers of power is of utmost importance—particularly the President. 261 Presidential elections have profound consequences on the Supreme
Court, the rest of the judiciary’s composition, as well as their likely rulings
in the national-security-immigration sphere. 262 Accordingly, advocacy
groups should incorporate electoral strategies within their general efforts at
transforming the national security-immigration space. 263 The theoretical
conception of litigation as entirely nonpartisan possibly delayed some
groups from adopting overt political and electoral strategies. 264
An online video campaign offers a powerful non-litigation example of advocacy against
the Muslim ban, which emphasizes the ban’s human impact in a visceral way, having
“crowdsourced 106 videos from Iranians, Americans, Iranian-Americans, Syrian-Americans,
Syrians, Somalians, and Yemeni individuals who are affected by the ban.” Travel Ban Through
the Eyes of Those Who Are in It, IN IT, https://in-it.com/travelban [https://perma.cc/2PAJ3M4D] (last visited Dec. 30, 2019) [hereinafter IN IT]; Bob Ortega, Separated by the Travel Ban,
These Couples are Taking to Video to Plead Their Case, CNN (May 28, 2019 11:08 AM),
https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/24/us/travel-ban-separation-video-campaign-invs/inde
260

x.html [https://perma.cc/FA9H-3JQ4].. The campaign encourages people to call on Congress to conduct oversight, clarify the waiver process, and provide an immediate family exemption to the ban. IN IT, supra. Groups such as America’s Voice offer additional approaches as it seeks “to harness the power of American voices and American values to enact policy
change that guarantees full labor, civil and political rights for immigrants and their families,”
including working with “faith-based” groups. About, AMERICA’S VOICE, https:/
/americasvoice.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/Y6FX-RH6A] (last visited Dec. 30, 2019).
See John Yoo & Robert J. Delahunty, Opinion, Supreme Court Travel Ban Decision Moves
Left’s Fight with Trump from the Courts to the Ballot Box, FOX NEWS (June 27, 2018),
;https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/supreme-court-travel-ban-decision-moves-lefts-fightwith-trump-from-the-courts-to-the-ballot-box [https://perma.cc/MVM8-YJPY]; Hamid,
supra note 11.
261

See generally The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (The Justices’ alignment in The
Muslim Ban Case evidences the electoral relationship to judicial outcomes with the familiar
five Republican appointees comprising the majority and the four Democrat appointees joining in dissent.).

262

263 See, e.g., Shakir, supra note 11 (discussing the ACLU’s first “serious” involvement in elections, attempting “to increase voters’ understanding and awareness of civil liberties issues”).

See, e.g., Social Welfare Organizations, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/othernon-profits/social-welfare-organizations [https://perma.cc/2UF8-L5CV] (“An organization
that has lost its section 501(c)(3) status due to substantial attempts to influence legislation
may not thereafter qualify as a section 501(c)(4) organization.”).

264
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Advocates should not, however, confuse or conflate partisan opposition to the Trump presidency with support for historically marginalized
groups. Notwithstanding appeals to intersectionality and the record number of minority women elected in the 2018 midterm elections, most politicians are unlikely to advocate non-citizen rights, particularly at times of
perceived threat. The USA PATRIOT Act votes tallies—98-1 in the Senate; 357-66 in the House265—in a Democratically-controlled Congress immediately after the 9/11 attacks demonstrate the nonpartisan allure of targeting out-groups’ rights in crises. 266
Second, advocates should build on the local interests that federal government overreach on immigration issues may present. The federal government’s primacy in anti-immigration efforts has also turned on its head
the simplistically conceived liberal-centralized government, conservativelocal-and-state government alignments. Local legislative efforts may enjoy
some limited success, as illustrated by local measures enacted relating to
“welcoming” or “sanctuary” cities and limits on local law enforcement cooperation with detainers. 267 The support for these measures, while often
regionalized or localized, indicate fertile ground for some popular advocacy. 268 Fostering more localized resistance to imposition of federal immigra265

147 CONG. REC. 20, 465–66; 147 CONG. REC. 20, 742.

See, e.g., USA Patriot Act 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 412 (Oct. 26, 2001), 115 Stat. 350–
51, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a (authorizing Attorney General to detain foreign nationals
suspected of terrorism on reduced standards of suspicions (“reasonable grounds to believe”)
and for initial seven-day periods and extended periods after immigration-related charges).

266

By one count, more than 170 states, cities, and counties have laws, policies, or practices
that limit cooperation with federal officials concerning information about, and access to,
aliens within their jurisdictions for purposes of enforcing federal civil immigration law. See
Bryan Griffith & Jessica M. Vaughan, Map: Sanctuary Cities, Counties, and States, CTR. FOR
IMMIGR. STUD., https://cis.org/Map-Sanctuary-Cities-Counties-and-States [https://perma.c
c/XH9M-V2BZ] (last updated Apr. 16, 2019). For example, the Chicago Municipal Code,
Welcoming City Ordinance provides “that immigrant community members, whether or not
documented, should be treated with respect and dignity by all City employees.” City of Chi.
v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 279 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing CHI., ILL. MUN. CODE § 2-173-005).
The ordinance proscribes city employees from providing immigration status information to,
or generally assisting, Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials for detention purposes based only on civil immigration law. Id. (citing CHI., ILL. MUN. CODE § 2-173-005).
The Seventh Circuit upheld a district court’s injunction against the Attorney General’s conditioning federal law enforcement grants on providing federal officials access to meet with
aliens and notice of their release dates, which ran afoul of Chicago’s ordinance. Id. at 278–
80. The court found that the city was likely to succeed on the merits because the attorney
general lacked statutory authority to impose the conditions. Id. at 283–88.
267

Polling on the Muslim ban, however—while of questionable reliability—suggests opinions largely divide along partisan lines. See Grace Sparks, Americans Have Been Split on Trump’s
Travel Ban for a While, CNN POLITICS (June 26, 2018), https://edition.cnn.com/2018/06/
26/politics/travel-ban-polling/index.html [https://perma.cc/QNM4-RTV6] (describing
varied poll results on the Muslim ban).
268
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tion mandates, in partnership with the local group chapters and religious
group mobilization through refugee sponsorship, sanctuary sites, and protests, are vital forms of expression and transformation of the dialogue. The
government’s national security policies have also rankled libertarian notions
of government, providing potentially fertile ground for rethinking the state
relationship to security and rights.269 Enabling these collective responses
should aid targeted groups in escaping the narrow and stultifying confines
of judicial precedent and the dry rhetoric of law. 270
Third, the most prominent civil-rights groups should be willing to get
out of the way of, or at least permit, nascent, organic, non-hierarchical organizations a seat at the table if not the head. They may even represent
these groups as their clients. 271 Widespread mobilization, whether emanating via online groups, places of worship, or on the street, is potentially
more agile and responsive than is the law or the courts to extreme actions
by the President. Moreover, these more-representative advocacy groups
need not be captive of dominant legal strategies and dominating legal strategists, i.e., lawyers. The rise of groups like Black Lives Matters and Occupy
Wall Street, which some characterize as a partial response to infirmities endemic to the traditional civil rights movement’s legalistic advocacy and topdown leadership, reflect the viability of the non-hierarchical approach. 272

See, e.g., Brief for The Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1,
Trump v. Hawaii (The Muslim Ban Case), 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-965/39755/20180323095217542_C
ato%20Amicus%20Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WYG-KF2T]) (describing “[t]he Cato Institute . . . [a]s a nonpartisan public policy research foundation dedicated to advancing the
principles of individual liberty, free markets, and limited government”).
269

Stella Elias describes these and similar state and local efforts as forms of “immigration
status ‘covering.’” Stella Burch Elias, Immigrant Covering, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 765, 831–
41 (2017). The positive consequences may include expanded “opportunities for immigrants .
. . [in] education, employment, and access to goods and services,” “psychological benefits”
due to allayed fears of deportation, and “treat[ment] on par with U.S. citizens.” Id. at 842–
43. However, Elias cautions, such “covering” laws are tainted by their “[i]mpermanence,
vulnerability, and absolute reliance on the continued good grace of the majority.” Id. at 849.
270

Scott Cummings explains that representing these “mobilized clients”—groups “that play
a leadership role in social change campaigns”—achieves at least purposes. Cummings, supra
note 259, at 1691. The representation (1) “associates lawyers with organized groups that
have the capacity to disrupt and thereby influence politics”; (2) ensures greater lawyer accountability due to mobilized clients’ “structure and authority”; and (3) improves representation because mobilized clients hold “legitimate authority derived from engagement with
and leadership of affected constituency members.” Id. at 1691–92.
271

See, e.g., Barbara Ransby, Opinion, Black Lives Matter is Democracy in Action, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/21/opinion/sunday/black-livesmatter-leadership.html [https://perma.cc/EP36-8M9K]; Jelani Cobb, The Matter of Black
Lives, NEW YORKER (Mar. 6, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/
03/14/where-is-black-lives-matter-headed [https://perma.cc/2HBF-FXRS].
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These groups offer alternative narratives to the dominant legal discourse. 273 Liberated from legal briefs and precedent, they provide various
conceptions of liberty, community, nationality, culture, and identity. 274
Witness the power and prevalence of Shepard Fairey’s “We the People”
poster depicting a young woman in a hijab made from an American flag. 275
The image offers a visceral, inclusive and patriotic vision of American identity distinct from the Court’s abstracted and parsimonious opinion. 276

273 See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, National Security, Immigration and the Muslim Bans, 75 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1475, 1502–06 (2018) (describing varied forms of “[r]esistance to Muslim
Bans outside of the courtroom”). See also Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 211, at 17–
18 (explaining that “diverse and divergent narrative traditions within the nation” challenge
and influence the meaning of the “authoritative text” and that “exercises a destabilizing influence upon power”).
274 See, e.g., AMERICA’S VOICE, supra note 260 (describing its mission as utilizing “the power
of American voices and American values to enact policy change that guarantees full labor,
civil and political rights for immigrants and their families”); IN IT, supra note 260 (“That’s
why we decided to create a collective voice showing what the Ban means for the nationals
of the banned countries and also expose how it is being implemented.”).
275 See Amah-Rose Abrams, Shepard Fairey Releases ‘We the People’ Series to Protest Trump,
ARTNET NEWS (Jan. 20, 2017), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/shepard-fairey-releaseswe-the-people-series-824468 [https://perma.cc/Q4ML-W2WA]. According to the Amplifier Foundation’s website, “We the People is a nonpartisan campaign dedicated to igniting a
national dialogue about American identity and values through public art and story sharing.”
About The Campaign, AMPLIFIER, https://amplifier.org/campaigns/we-the-people/
[https://perma.cc/HDX4-9HR2] The campaign provided free images to download as “new
symbols of hope to combat the rising power of nationalism, bigotry, and intolerance.” Id.
The campaign works “with change movements, educators, and innovative thinkers to bring
We The People into schools and communities around the country.” Id.

Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 211, at 11 (“[T]he creation of legal meaning—
‘jurisgenesis’—takes place always through an essentially cultural medium.”).
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The potent image, which was held aloft in marches and protests following the President’s inauguration and afterward, challenges the “otherizing” of Muslims and Muslim women in particular.278 Rather than a clash of
Western and Muslim civilizations—a narrative heralded since the 9/11 attacks 279— and one of Trump’s supporting rationales for the Muslim
ban 280—the image merges and celebrates Muslim and American identity.
Roaa Ali identifies the simultaneously subversive and patriotic message the
poster conveys:
By appropriating the ultimate signifier of national patriotism, the American flag, as a signifier of religious identity that is visibly female; those Muslim women reclaimed
their gender and religious identity as decidedly American.
That stars-and-stripes hijab is a political statement denoting that these women’s Muslim identity is not at odds with
277

About The Campaign, supra note 275.

Roaa H. Ali, The Women’s March That Welcomed the Hijab as a Sign of Dissidence: Pink, Rainbows, and an American-Flag Hijab, 3 INTERDISC. PERSPS. ON EQUAL. AND DIVERSITY at 1, 4
(2017), http://journals.hw.ac.uk/index.php/IPED/article/view/51/32.
278

279

Id. at 6.

See Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees: Exclusive Interview with Donald Trump, CNN TRANSCRIPTS
(Mar. 9, 2016, 8:00 PM), http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1603/09/acd.01.html
[https://perma.cc/YN9T-NW74]) (“I think Islam hates us . . . we can’t allow people coming into this country who have this hatred of the United States . . . [a]nd of people that are
not Muslim.”).
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their American identity, nor are their bodies an offense to
the national body. 281
But a greater shift is needed to normalize the hijab—Muslim identity—
within American cultural and legal frameworks. That transformation must
embrace a common humanity that transcends the dominant theories of the
state and social contract.
C. Finding National Identity in Family and Religion
Margulies and Metcalf maintain that the legalistic battle over rights obscures the fight over national identity. 282 Despite my skepticism about
whether an actual national identity exists, the underlying observation and
challenge are well taken. As this article has discussed, unchecked political
power invariably wields its authority most negatively on non-citizens and
minority groups during crises, permitting the height of political powers to
adversely target those who are least represented and have the least rights.
Thus, a more inclusive and extralegal narrative is needed.
1. Nationalistic Rights Theory
The difficult rights terrain has its roots in social-contract theory, which
is wedded to principles of sovereignty, a powerful executive to ward off invaders, and political society membership. The traditionally and legally confined definition of rights is therefore unlikely to avail non-citizens and marginalized groups in the national security context. Rethinking that rights
framework may offer new ways of thinking about alternative narratives and
legal consequences under which security-based fears do not inevitably
translate into the state’s infringement of both minority group and noncitizens’ interests.
Rights may be generally defined as “benefits secured for persons by
rules regulating the relationships between those persons and other persons
subjects to those rules.”283 These rights also may be defined in relation to
the state, as in the Bill of Rights. 284 But social contract theory vests the
state with tremendous power over the rights holders. Hobbes located in a

281

Ali, supra note 278, at 7.

282

See Margulies & Metcalf, supra note 111, at 463.

See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 203-04 (2d ed. 2011) (emphasis
omitted).
283

284 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”).

The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice

62

[23:2020]

“Common Power”—the Leviathan or mortal god—the only solution to
humanity’s warring against itself and “invasion of Forraigners.” 285 The
people consented to the Common Power’s governance through mutual
covenants with one another. 286
Locke’s conception of the state departs from Hobbes in that it operates under the familiar tripartite government framework (entailing “indifferent and upright judges” and use of force “to prevent or redress foreign
injuries, and secure the community from inroads and invasion”).287 But
Locke still vested near-exclusive powers in the Executive relating to “war
and peace, leagues and alliances, and all the transactions with all persons
and communities without the commonwealth.”288
Locke’s social-contract theory also envisions that people utilize the
democratic process to realize “the peace, safety, and public good of the
people,” which must include preserving liberty and property. 289 Yet they
become subjects to “any earthly power” only through “express consent.” 290
Any lesser relationship to a government, via “tacit consent”, which “foreigners” might enjoy through owning property, “makes not a man a member of that society.” 291 Though Locke’s theory undergirds a rationale for
resisting political institutions, it also defines the boundaries of the society’s
membership and its attendant duties and rights.
2. Family Members’ “Almost Natural” Consent to the State
Locke recognized a latent ambiguity in his theory insofar as not every
person in society could have expressly consented to its governance. 292 Jeremy Waldron addresses the possible gap in membership by proposing a
third form of “almost natural” consent to the political system, “in the sense
that they have grown up with it and acquiesced in its development and in
its authority at every stage.” 293 So conceived, Waldron’s “incremental”,
285

THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 131 (Oxford Univ. Press 1929) (1651).

286

Id. at 131–32.

287 JOHN

LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 259 (George Routledge & Sons 2d ed.
1887) (1689).
288

Id. at 268.

289

Id. at 265.

290

Id. 257.
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Id. at 259–60.

292 Id.

at 242.

Jeremy Waldron, John Locke: Social Contract Versus Political Anthropology, 51 REV. OF
POLITICS 3, 19–21, 23 (1989) (quoting LOCKE, supra note 287) [hereinafter Waldron, John
Locke].
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evolutionary form of consent may cohere with a contractualist theory, even
though “the whole process was not the subject of anyone’s intentions and that
the overall direction of the development was unforeseen.” 294 These notions
of natural consent to membership and its obligations also should inform
the development of rights held by those who did not formally assent to the
political society’s governance. 295
Those in close or familial relationships to members hold potentially viable claims to membership and equal rights in that political society. In illustrating “natural consent” to an authority and formation of political societies, Locke’s anthropological account focused on the family example (“the
government commonly began in the father”) 296 and attributed early societies’ subsistence to the care of “nursing fathers.”297 Waldron contends that
one may employ the “almost natural” consent theory as “a way of characterizing a particular set of historical events, such as the gradual emergence
of a polity out of a family.” 298 Examining relationships between individuals
and the state entails using “judgment to discern” whether people have consented so far as to satisfy Locke’s theory and thus enjoy the rights afforded
by the political society. 299
Under the “almost natural” consent theory, we might determine that
foreign family members and U.S. citizens enjoy relationships (“liberty interests”) such that the government should view favorably the former group’s
admission to the United States. The role of family may assist in refashioning the rights framework, which will prove politically and morally acceptable in the national security-immigration context.
The emphasis on family may also hold some appeal to some conservative and libertarian groups who tend to disfavor government intrusion. 300
The family is a model subsidiarity—an associational group which fulfills
social functions “not at the lowest possible level, but rather at the right lev-
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Id. at 25.
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Id. at 20.
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LOCKE, supra note 287, at 245. See also Waldron, John Locke, supra note 293, at 19–20.
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LOCKE, supra note 287.
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Waldron, John Locke, supra note 293, at 24–25.
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Id. at 25.

See, e.g., Abby M. McCloskey, Beyond Growth, 41 NAT’L AFF. (2019),
https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/beyond-growth?smid=nytcore-iosshare [https://perma.cc/2UPT-TPBE] (observing that conservative vision recognizes
“economy will be strong and inclusive only if it’s built on a foundation of close ties among
families and communities” rather than through government programs).
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el.” 301 The notion of family and subsidiarity resists transferring all authority
to the central government. Dominic Burbidge advises “that the need to
coordinate the pursuit of specific good in order to arrive at the common
good is not a responsibility specific to the state.” 302 Rather, “it is the family,
which has the most direct line into the formation of the habits, manners
and social mores that bring about the coordination of society’s parts.” 303
And among these parts, which the family coordinates, is of course, religion.
Thus to resist family unification on religious grounds implicates two
core and interdependent features of one’s personal and collective identities;
it is why the family and religion have long been seen as intertwined and
fundamental to American identity. 304 The Court’s refusal to recognize that
the Muslim ban amounted to this two-fold violation of ideals and principles highly valued by the American social compact is tragic—particularly
because it knew otherwise.
3. Plenary Power
Early court opinions on admitting foreign nationals to the United
States are not pretty. They traffic in themes not all that distinct from
Hobbes’ and Locke’s fears of invading “Forraigners,” powerful governance, and exclusive social membership even when the state’s interest is not
security related. Thus, in The Chinese Exclusion Case the Court readily deferred to Congress, upholding its exclusion and expulsion of Chinese laborers who had left the United States prior to the passage of the relevant
law:
Those laborers are not citizens of the United States;
they are aliens. That the government of the United States,
through the action of the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do
not think open to controversy.

Dominic Burbidge, The Inherently Political Nature of Subsidiarity, 62 AM. J. JURIS. 143, 144
(2017) (quoting Jonathan Chaplin, Subsidiarity and Social Pluralism, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES
ON SUBSIDIARITY 72 (Michelle Evans & Augusto Zimmerman eds. 2014)) (emphasis omitted).
301

302

Id. at 158.

303

Id.

See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231 (1972) (holding that the state may not
compel Amish parents to send children to school until age sixteen). The Court in Yoder emphasized the importance of “traditional concepts of parental control over the religious upbringing and education of their minor children” and that “an intrusion by a State [such as
compelling the Amish to go to school] into family decisions in the area of religious training
would give rise to grave questions of religious freedom.” Id.
304
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....
If, therefore, the government of the United States,
through its legislative department, considers the presence
of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will
not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion is not to be stayed because at the
time there are no actual hostilities with the nation of
which the foreigners are subjects . . . . [I]ts determination
is conclusive upon the judiciary. 305
This plenary-power doctrine 306—a political theory of state power and
citizenship—enables a legal and political narrative that harbors racist, xenophobic, and nationalistic instincts along with deference to the political
branches. 307 Thus the Court indulged the nativist and populist sentiments
that Chinese “immigration was in numbers approaching the character of an
Oriental invasion, and was a menace to our civilization.” 308 And in Korematsu, the Court revealed how tenuous are the legal protections for citizens
of particular national or ethnic backgrounds when it deferred to the military’s judgment that, “[l]ike curfew, exclusion of those of Japanese origin
was deemed necessary because of the presence of an unascertained number
of disloyal members of the group, most of whom we have no doubt were
loyal to this country.” 309
The Muslim Ban Case Court’s adoption of the Kleindienst v. Mandel standard of review cannot be easily separated from the latter opinion’s xenophobic and judicially-enervating origins. Mandel relied heavily on The Chinese
Exclusion Case, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, and the plenary power doctrine
in holding that it would “not look behind” the Executive’s denial of entry
to a foreign person implicating an American citizen’s First Amendment
right to receive information and hear ideas, when the government acts “on
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 603, 606
(1889).
305

See generally Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Cases: The “Plenary Power” Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 ASIAN L.J. 13 (2003) (discussing
how the plenary power doctrine affects ongoing jurisprudence).

306

See Olsen v. Albright, 990 F. Supp. 31, 37 (D.D.C. 1997) (“During most of its history, the
United States openly discriminated against individuals on the basis of race and national
origin in its immigration laws.”). Hobbes echoes in this judicial deference, allowing little
daylight between the state and the court’s legal interpretation. See HOBBES, supra note 285, at
211–12 (“And therefore the interpretation of all Lawes dependeth on the Authority Sovereign; and the Interpreters can be none but those, which the Sovereign, (to whom only the
Subject oweth obedience) shall appoint.”).
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The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 595.
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Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1944).
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the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason.” 310 As Justice Marshall wryly noted in his dissent, “[t]hese cases are not the strongest precedents in the United States Reports.” 311
4. Communitarian Immigration Principles
Both before and certainly after Mandel, there has been a rising legal and
collective consciousness that non-citizens form an integral part of the nation, quite apart from an express consent or citizenship status, and merit
constitutional and judicial protections. 312 As courts recognized the rights of
individuals in the domestic context, including those of minorities, and in
particular aliens, it became harder to rationalize not affording fundamental
rights to those persons seeking admission to the country. 313
Monumental changes in constitutional law, as expressed in the prohibition on racial segregation in Brown v. Board of Education 314 and following developments in civil-rights laws challenged discriminatory classifications restrictions on non-citizens’ entry. 315 Similarly, alien-focused decisions such
as Plyer v. Doe, 316 which held that, on equal protection grounds, Texas could
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765, 770 (1972) (citing The Chinese Exclusion Case,
130 U.S. at 609; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)). “The Court without
exception has sustained Congress’ ‘plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens
and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which Congress has forbidden.’” Id.
at 766 (quoting Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967)).
310

Id. at 781 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall goes on to reference The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) and Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).

311

See Catherine Y. Kim, Plenary Power in the Modern Administrative State, 96 N.C. L. REV. 77,
79 (2017) (“[C]ommentators have been discussing the ‘demise’ of plenary power for decades.”); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 566 (1990) (“By the 1950’s, aliens’
rights decisions beyond the scope of immigration law already conflicted with assumptions
implicit in the plenary power doctrine.”); Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration
Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 49 (1984) (attributing changes in immigration law to “the emergence of new, ‘communitarian’ public law norms”).
312

313 See Cox, supra note 197 (“[T]he Supreme Court has never upheld an immigration policy
that openly discriminated on the basis of race or religion during a period of constitutional
history when such a policy would have been clearly unconstitutional in the domestic context.”). See also Motomura, supra note 312, at 566–67 (contending that case law protecting
aliens’ rights and “other developments in the law of individual rights, have provided the
normative foundation for results at odds with strict application of the plenary power doctrine”); Schuck, supra note 312, at 64 (attributing developing expanded government duty and
non-citizens’ “legal protections” in the exclusion process to “abstract principles gleaned
from the congeries of domestic law norms, including constitutional due process and equal
protection, the Refugee Act of 1980, and judicially elaborated communitarian values”).
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Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Shawnee Cty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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See Motomura, supra note 312, at 566; Cox, supra note 197.
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See generally Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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not deny non-citizen children a public education, recognized that citizenship alone could not be a basis for acceptance into American society and
provision of legal rights. 317
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) Amendments of 1965 also
reflected this same tendency, introducing principles of non-discrimination
that are at the heart of The Muslim Ban Case. In signing the INA into law,
President Johnson explained that its purpose was to alleviate the “harsh injustice of the national origins quota system.”318 Reflecting the national
moment of turning from anti-discriminatory policies, Congress passed the
INA “alongside the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of
1965.” 319 As part of its anti-discrimination design, INA, 18 U.S.C. §
1152(a)(1)(A) reads: “no person shall . . . be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex, nationality,
place of birth, or place of residence.” 320
Immigration policy’s preferences for family reunification go back almost a century. 321 But in eradicating the national origins quotas, the 1965
Amendments further clarified the prioritization of family relationships in

317 See Motomura, supra note 312, at 584 (“Plyler recognized the membership of these undocumented children in American society as an accomplished fact, and further recognized
that they could not be excluded by fiat from constitutional rights and privileges.”); Schuck,
supra note 312, at 54 (arguing that Plyler “may mark a fundamental break with classical immigration law’s concept of national community and of the scope of congressional power to
decide who is entitled to the benefits of membership”). Just one year prior to The Muslim
Ban Case, the Court again accepted the progressive influence of domestic constitutional law
on immigration classifications, holding that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited requiring different durations for fathers and mothers’ presence in the United States in determining
U.S. citizenship of children born abroad to unwed parents. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137
S. Ct. 1678, 1686 (2017). There, the Court rejected arguments from Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S.
787 (1977), which concerned immigration entry preferences for non-citizen children born to
mothers, and its assertion that “minimal scrutiny (rational-basis review)” should apply. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1693. Whereas, Fiallo gave “Congress’ ‘exceptionally broad power’
to admit or exclude aliens,” Morales-Santana’s claim was that of a U.S. citizen, thus requiring heightened scrutiny under established constitutional law. Id. at 1693–94 (quoting Fiallo,
430 U.S. at 792, 794). The Court has also recognized that an alien’s presence—even unlawful—within the United States provides the person greater legal protections than someone
who has not yet entered the country. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)
(holding detention of removable alien exceeding six months presumptively unreasonable).

See Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing of the Immigration Bill, 2 PUB. PAPERS
1037–40 (1966).
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allocating family-sponsored immigrant visas.322 The current provision,
INA, § 1153, prioritizes allotting visas to (1) unmarried sons and daughters
of citizens, (2) spouses and unmarried sons and unmarried daughters of
permanent resident aliens, (3) married sons and married daughters of citizens, and (4) brothers and sisters of citizens.323
In its review of the plaintiffs’ statutory claims, The Muslim Ban Case
Court rejected the legislative emphasis on nondiscrimination and family
preservation in issuing immigrant visas. Ignoring Congress’s more recent
expressions of fundamental American values, the Court held that the ban
was a proper use of presidential authority under INA, § 1182(f), to “suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to
be appropriate.” 324 Revealing its hand early, the Court stated that the statute “exudes deference to the President in every clause.” 325 The Court proceeded to reject arguments that the President must provide “sufficient[ly]
detail[ed]” findings that would allow for judicial review. 326 The Court also
rejected the notion that the anti-discrimination statute could be read so
broadly as to apply to the President’s authority to suspend entry based on
nationality. 327 Nowhere does the Court even reference the judicial and legislative watersheds that had commentators poised to bury the plenary power doctrine. 328
More than three decades ago, Peter Schuck asked whether these same
judicial and legislative developments reflected “communitarian” principles
that “the government owes legal duties to all individuals who manage to
reach America’s shores, even to strangers whom it has never undertaken,

322 See Johnson, supra note 318 (“This bill says simply that from this day forth those wishing
to immigrate to America shall be admitted on the basis of their skills and their close relationship to those already here.”).
323

8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2018).
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8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2018).
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Trump v. Hawaii (The Muslim Ban Case), 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2408 (2018).
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Id. at 2409.

327

Id. at 2413–15.

Following The Muslim Ban Case, members of Congress introduced bills that would, among
other things, amend 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) to include prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of religion in visa and entry decisions. H.R. 2214, 116th Cong. (2019); S. 1123, 116th
Cong. (2019). The bills would also amend 8 U.S.C. 1182(f) to limit the President’s suspension-of-entry power by clarifying that § 1152(a)(1)(A) applies, requiring factual findings, imposing congressional notification and consultation requirements, and voiding all executive
orders and proclamations constituting the current Muslim ban. H.R. 2214; S. 1123.
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and has no wish, to protect.” 329 Schuck suggested that the expansion of
government duties and emphasis on group rights planted the seeds for
broadening conceptions of national identity and related rights and duties. 330
Recognizing that “individuals, societies and nations are bound to each other by pervasive interdependencies,” Schuck derived the following “moral
and legal consequences” for society:
[S]ocially accepted values should augment consent as a
basis for imputing legal duties; that the conception of national sovereignty should be weakened in order to define
the relationship between the United States and aliens in
terms of morally significant, informal social interactions;
and that membership in our national community should
depend not upon formalistic criteria but upon the functional social linkages actually forged between aliens and
the American people. 331
Familial relationships, as recognized in the INA’s family reunification
preferences, provide the “almost natural” consent and “social linkages”
with Americans for imposing duties on the government’s treatment of noncitizens seeking entry to the United States.332 The Muslim Ban Case, however,
demonstrates that the Court still operates under the racist and xenophobic
vestiges of the plenary power doctrine, ignoring universal antidiscriminatory principles and resists accommodating and expanding the national community by affording protections to American Muslim citizens
whose family members have been denied entry.
5. Judicial Betrayal of Family and Religion
The Muslim Ban Case most profoundly disappoints in its failure to keep
faith with the protections Congress affords immigrant family members and
the protections the Constitution guarantees religious minorities. The
Court’s ambivalence concerning foreign family relationships was on display
in the 2015 Kerry v. Din opinion. Justice Scalia penned a plurality in which
he declared: “[o]nly by diluting the meaning of a fundamental liberty interSchuck, supra note 312, at 4. Justice Breyer has similarly suggested that globalization and
international interdependence call into question some legal citizen-alien distinctions.
BREYER, supra note 3, at 85 (“[I]n a world of extensive travel and immigration, of worldwide
commerce, and of the Internet, the ‘foreignness’ of an alien is not quite what it used to
be.”).
329
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8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2018); Waldron, John Locke, supra note 293, at 24–25; Schuck, supra
note 312, at 50.
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est and jettisoning our established jurisprudence could we conclude that the
denial of [the non-citizen spouse] Berashk’s visa application implicates any
of Din’s fundamental liberty interests.” 333 Justice Kennedy (along with Justice Alito) would have assumed the spouse had such a liberty interest, but
found that the notice of visa denial satisfied due process. 334 Dissenting for
the four member minority, Justice Breyer recognized a person’s liberty interest in the “freedom to live together with her [foreign national] husband
in the United States” and found the visa denial did not satisfy procedural
due process guarantees. 335
The Scalia-Breyer dispute over liberty interests concerning foreign family member relationships fits within the familiar debate over the meaning
and sources of constitutional rights. For Scalia, claims to any “implied fundamental rights” are suspect because they are “textually unsupportable”
and “‘outside the arena of public debate and legislative action.’” 336 Scalia
pointedly discounts Congress’s “‘continuing and kindly concern . . . for the
unity and the happiness of the immigrant family’” as “a matter of legislative
grace rather than fundamental right.” 337 Breyer would have held that the
liberty interests in marriage and to live with her husband in the United
States rested within the purposes and objectives of the Due Process Clause
as well as legislative immigration provisions reflecting concern for the family unit. 338
Only eleven days after the Court issued its ruling in Din, the Court delivered Obergefell v. Hodges, upholding a constitutional right to same-sex marriage as vested in the Due Process Clause. 339 There, Justice Kennedy explained how the right to marry “safeguards children and families,” 340 and
“allows children ‘to understand the integrity and closeness of their own
family and its concord with other families in their community and in their

333

Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2136 (2015) (plurality opinion).

Id. at 2139 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also id. (“Today’s disposition should not be interpreted as deciding whether a citizen has a protected liberty interest in the visa application
of her alien spouse.”).
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Id. at 2136 (quoting E. P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
IMMIGRATION POLICY 1798–1965 at 518 (1981)).
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daily lives.’” 341 The liberty interest in family unity would seem now established.
At its heart though, a debate over the breadth of constitutional rights
devolves into questions of whose interests. Recognizing the familial relationship’s significance not only invites a multiplicity of legal rights and meanings but invariably enlarges the society. These tensions roil just below the
surface of The Muslim Ban Case.
The Court could not ignore the ban’s widespread disruptive impact on
families. The Court initially gestured toward the significance of relationship
with foreign family members in interlocutory orders. In partially granting a
stay sought by the government, the Court held that the Muslim ban “may
not be enforced against foreign nationals who have a credible claim of a
bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.” 342 The
Court accepted that “a close familial relationship” could consist of family
members, including parents, children, siblings, “grandparents, grandchildren, brothers-in-law, sisters-in-law, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and
cousins of persons in the United States.” 343 But concern for maintaining
the family relationship proved fleeting.
Instead, the Court’s invocation of family became a Trojan horse. The
Court accepted as a basis for standing the plaintiff Dr. Ismail Elshikh’s allegations that, for example, the ban injured him “by preventing him from
reuniting with his relatives,” but not by “denigrating him as a Muslim and
an Imam.” 344 The Court explained that it would not decide the spiritual and
341

Id. at 2600 (quoting United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 772 (2013)).

342 Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2088 (2017). The Court held
that “for entities, the relationship must be formal, documented, and formed in the ordinary
course, rather than for the purpose of evading [the ban].” Id. Relationships between a university and admitted student, and employer and employee, or a university and an invited
lecturer satisfied the Court’s criteria. Id. The Court later clarified, however, that the ban
would apply to refugees with formal assurances from resettlement agencies. See Trump v.
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 1 (Mem.) (2017) (staying in part Hawaii v. Trump, 871 F.3d 646 (9th Cir.
2017)).

Hawaii, 871 F.3d at 658, 658 n.8. See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 1 (Mem) (leaving intact Ninth
Circuit’s elaboration on family relationships). The Court’s broad understanding of family
rested on the “the accumulated wisdom of civilization, gained over the centuries and honored throughout our history’ that was worthy of constitutional protection.” Hawaii, 871 F.3d
at 658 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505 (1977)). The Muslim Ban
Case majority also emphasized that the Proclamation’s waiver program, which may apply to
“foreign national[s] seek[ing] to reside with a close family member” supported the “Government’s claim of a legitimate national security interest.” Trump v. Hawaii (The Muslim Ban
Case), 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2422 (2018).
343

Proposed Third Amended Complaint, supra note 35; The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at
2416 (describing plaintiffs’ arguments that the ban “‘establishes a disfavored faith’ and violates ‘their own right to be free from federal [religious] establishments.’”) (citing Brief for
344
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dignitary interest claim because the family separation claims offers a “more
concrete injury.”345
Yet the Court immediately questioned whether the plaintiffs could establish an Establishment Clause violation because the ban does not apply
to them, “but to others seeking to enter the United States.” 346 This twist of
reasoning is neither logical nor consistent with precedent. Parents may, for
example, assert, along with their children, Establishment Clause claims relating to statutes compelling the children to read the bible in public
schools. 347 And the Court has long recognized the vital relationship between family and religion.348
In arriving at its adumbrated, deferential review, the Court resisted its
own seeming evolution on constitutional rights claims involving noncitizens’ entry to the United States. Six Justices in Kerry v. Din had endorsed
“look[ing] behind” the government’s reasons denying admission to noncitizen family members when there was “an affirmative showing of bad
faith.” 349 But The Muslim Ban Case majority adopted Mandel’s abstracted
embrace of executive power over Din’s attention to family, discarding its
potentially heightened standard when family interests are implicated in the
immigration context. 350
Respondents at 27–28, Trump v. Hawaii (The Muslim Ban Case), 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No.
17-965) https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-965/39833/20180323141105
422_17-965bs--Merits%20Response--AS%20FILED.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SG2E-KH
FC] (emphasis omitted)).
345

The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2416.

346

Id.

See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 n.9 (1963). The
Schempp Court considered the parents “directly affected” by the state law, but family members within the United States are similarly “directly affected” by the ban. See id. The “direct
affect” accentuates the importance of religion to family and identity.
347

348 See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) (“The Constitution decrees that
religion must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private
choice . . . .”); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970)
(“A person or a family may have a spiritual stake in First Amendment values sufficient to
give standing to raise issues concerning the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause.”) (citing Schempp, 374 U.S. 203). Even secular “religious” events entwine the family.
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 710 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“When government decides to recognize Christmas day as a public holiday, it does no more than accommodate the calendar of public activities to the plain fact that many Americans will expect on
that day to spend time visiting with their families, attending religious services, and perhaps
enjoying some respite from pre-holiday activities.”).
349

Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

Compare The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2419 (“[O]ur opinions have reaffirmed and
applied [Mandel’s] deferential standard of review across different contexts and constitutional
claims.”), with id. at 2440 n.5 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (maintaining that, under Mandel and
350
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The Court ultimately did not address whether the Establishment
Clause’s scope provided a legal interest in the admission of foreign family
members.351 But an Establishment Clause violation, as manifested in the
government’s disfavoring a religion, invariably amounts to an attack on the
family—its traditions, rituals, morality, and identity. The ban inhabits that
destructive effect in its fullest form. The cruel irony is that the form of the
Establishment Clause violation—its barrier on entry to foreign family
members—is precisely what afforded the policy its deferential review and
resistance to allegations of any religious animus.352
The Muslim ban is therefore doubly pernicious. It simultaneously
keeps family members of Muslim-Americans outside the United States,
rupturing their family and faith, and also tells them, as “members of minority faiths ‘that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community.’” 353 Thus, Muslim citizens do not enjoy the same protections for their
religious exercise as do citizens of other faiths.354
The Court reinforced its message of religious bigotry through its decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which it
released only twenty-four days earlier. 355 There, the Court held there that
several Colorado Civil Rights Commissioner’s statements reflected animosity to religion such that they violated the Free Exercise Clause when they
ruled that a Christian bakery shop owner’s refusal on religious grounds to
create a cake for a same-sex couple’s wedding violated the state’s antidiscrimination law. 356
Both Masterpiece and The Muslim Ban Case addressed “whether a government actor exhibited tolerance and neutrality in reaching a decision that
affects individuals’ fundamental religious freedom.” 357 But in contrast to
Din, “‘an affirmative showing of bad faith,’” requires “looking behind the face of the Proclamation””)” (quoting Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2141).
351

Id. at 2416.

352

Id. at 2418–19, 2423.

Id. at 2434 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530
U.S. 290, 309 (2000)).
353

Id. at 2446–47 (noting the Court’s more exacting scrutiny of religious discrimination
claim asserted by a Christian baker in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1734 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)).

354

See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1734
(2018)
355

356

Id. at 1723–24.

The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2447 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Although Masterpiece
and The Muslim Ban Case address distinct religious clause claims, the analysis should arguably
be the same. See id. at 2442 (“[U]nder Supreme Court precedent, laws ‘involving discrimina357
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The Muslim Ban Case, the Masterpiece Court rigorously reviewed the commissioners’ statements—fewer in number and less disparaging than the President’s tweets and press releases—for religious animus. 358 The Masterpiece
Court did indeed “look behind” the commission process, assessing “‘the
historical background of the decision under challenge, the specific series of
events leading to the enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative or administrative history, including contemporaneous statements
made by members of the decision making body.’” 359 To be sure, the facts
of that case took place squarely within domestic confines. But the Court’s
wildly divergent standard of review in The Muslim Ban Case “erodes the
foundational principles of religious tolerance that the Court elsewhere has
so emphatically protected,” 360 and compounds the message that some
groups’ religions and their intimate liberty interests merit less protection
than others.
The cowardice of The Muslim Ban Case lies in its refusal to champion
Congress’s (the popular representative body) progressive opposition to discrimination and preferences for family cohesion in immigration as expressed in the INA, and to uphold the family’s integral role to religious belief, as protected by the Establishment Clause.361 The Court thus employed
its rights analysis within a context of national security that immediately elevated the government interest and diminished the individual interest. 362
tion on the basis of religion, including interdenominational discrimination, are subject to
heightened scrutiny whether they arise under the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment
Clause, or the Equal Protection Clause.’” (quoting Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534
F.3d 1245, 1266 (10th Cir. 2008); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993) (“The Free Exercise Clause, like the Establishment Clause, extends
beyond facial discrimination.”); id. at 540 (discussing how addressing neutral laws under either the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause “‘requires an equal protection
mode of analysis,’” which entails “determin[ing] the [law’s] object from both direct and circumstantial evidence.”) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring)). The alternative view maintains that invoking different religious
clauses should receive distinct analysis. See supra notes 238–51 and accompanying text.
358

Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1729–31.

359

Id. at 1731 (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 540).

360

The Muslim Ban Case, 138 S. Ct. at 2447 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

The Court also might have considered that the interests in family integrity and freedom
from religious animus “reinforce each other” and therefore “heighten scrutiny of a claim
that might seem at first to merit more deferential review.” Brief for Immigration, Family,
and Constitutional Law Professors, supra note 197, at 20–21 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 223 (1982)); Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, Cumulative Constitutional Rights, 97
B.U. L. REV. 1309, 1338–39 (2017)).
361

This is the way rights are so often measured against one another. John Finnis explains
that rights require “certain sorts of milieu—a context or framework of mutual respect and
trust and common understanding, and environment which is physically heathy and in which
the weak can go about without fear of the whims of the strong.” FINNIS, supra note 283, at
362
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But if we reconceive national identity along “communitarian principles” and allow that the familial relationship is integral to our polity via
“almost natural” consent and to the Establishment Clause, the weighing of
interests may shift, at least to the extent that a court should review a policy’s hateful motivations.363 This is what the Court should have done when
it considered not simply the interest of the adverse parties, but the “public
interest”—“the possibility of a complete, intact family to tens of thousands
of Americans.” 364 An even braver Court might also have looked beyond
the family unit and considered the constitutional values and human relationships, which would prohibit the United States from denying entry on
the basis of religion to all non-citizens, including refugees, regardless of
familial connection to the United States. 365 But that is not our Court. Advocates must look first to other forums in which to vindicate the universal
and American values of nondiscrimination, religious freedom, protection of
refugees, and family reunification. Only under the shadow of this new social contract should we expect the Court to heavily scrutinize the government’s exclusion of foreign family members and refugees.
VI. CONCLUSION
Surveying the Supreme Court’s opinions during wartime, Chief Justice
Rehnquist said: “While we would not want to subscribe to the full sweep of
the Latin maxim—Inter Arma Silent Leges—in time of war the laws are
silent, perhaps we can accept the proposition that though the laws are not

216. Rights may be restricted on the basis then of public morality or public order. Id. These
principles could support greater security at the expense of individual rights. But so too could
such principles or another rights framework limit and inform rights based on the sanctity of
the human relationship.
363

Schuck, supra note 312, at 49–50.

Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 271 (4th Cir. 2018), as amended
(Feb. 28, 2018), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (2018).

364

A year prior to its final ruling in The Muslim Ban Case, the Court showed its disregard for
refugees, granting in part a stay of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that would have enjoined the
ban against those refugees with formal assurances from a resettlement agency. Trump v.
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 1 (Mem) (2017). These refugees had already undergone and cleared eighteen to twenty-four months screening processes, which would have found they satisfied legal
refugee status, security, and medical requirements. Hawaii v. Trump, 871 F.3d 646, 660 (9th
Cir. 2017). They also would have already established substantial connections to the United
States. The Ninth Circuit explained that in reaching a formal assurance of location, resettlement agencies “consider whether a refugee has family ties in a certain locality, whether the
local agency has the language skills necessary to communicate with the refugee, whether the
refugee’s medical needs can be addressed in the local community, and whether employment
opportunities are available and accessible.” Id. These connections also merited constitutional
protection and meaningful judicial review. At the time, there were 23,958 refugees with
these formal assurances. Id.
365
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silent in wartime, they speak with a muted voice.” 366 That is one view—a
decidedly judicial view, entrenched in legal schema that favor a powerful
executive and ignore marginalized victims. It is a judicial posture that has
enabled the Court to embrace nationalistic xenophobia and racism in the
name of security. 367 But revising litigation and advocacy approaches to incorporate multiple perspectives of identity, community, and the state may
overcome that judicial and legal stasis. Thus, in order to best preserve and
protect marginalized group members’ liberty interests—including such universal and American values as religion and family—advocates should not
quit the Court, but quiet its voice.

Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Remarks at the 100th Anniversary Celebration of the
Norfolk and Portsmouth Bar Association, Norfolk, Virginia (May 3, 2000),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeech/sp_05-03-00 [https://p
erma.cc/J7BA-DBTK].
366

Id. Rehnquist contended that judicial deference during wartime “represents something
more than some sort of patriotic hysteria that holds the judiciary in its grip.” Id. But, as the
foregoing demonstrates, the legal rights framework in which advocates contest security and
individual liberties, accommodates and nurtures “patriotic hysteria” by prioritizing executive
power and accentuating citizenship, and thus stigmatizes and delegitimizes non-citizen interests. Id.
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